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Health Care Rationing in the Courts: A
Comparative Study
By TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST!
The claim of the legally insured person against his insurer for medical
treatment encompasses not just traditional medicine, but also the par-
ticular schools of alternative medicine.... This is in accordance with
constitutional requirements. The obligatorily insured patient has a
right of self determination for his medical treatment pursuant to the
right of personality, in connection with the [constitutionally protected]
right of bodily integrity.... With payment of his health insurance
premiums, he has also gained a property-like right to comprehensive
insurance protection.
The augmentative communication device the State will provide Fred C.
will reportedly cost about six thousand penurious dollars. Mindful of
the practical need to reduce medical costs, the Court nevertheless has
before it no evidence that Texas Medicaid will now be required to fund
untold numbers of ACDs .... The Court declines the invitation to
reach the callous result of denying one forty-seven year old an aug-
mentative communication device which would routinely be provided
were he under the age of twenty-one.
2
I feel extremely sorry for the particular applicants in this case who
have to wait a long time, not being emergency cases, for necessary sur-
* Newton D. Baker, Baker and Hostetler Chaired Professor, College of Law and
Professor, College of Medicine and Public Health, The Ohio State University, Guest
Professor, Universitaet Goettingen, 1996-97. The author wishes to thank Professor Dr.
Erwin Deutsch, in whose institute much of this article was written, the Fulbright Foun-
dation, which funded my research during 1996-97, and the DAAD, which funded earlier
research on this topic in 1994. Numerous persons in Germany provided helpful infor-
mation that contributed to this article, but the author would particularly like to thank Drs.
Engelmann and Udsching of the German Supreme Social Court; Professors Ebsen, von
Maydell, Heinze, Steinmeyer, Gitter, and Schulin; and Drs. Gerhard Brenner, Franz
Knieps, and Dieter Barth for their help. David Hughes was very helpful with keeping me
up to date with British developments. If I misunderstood anything my informants told
me, the fault is all mine.
1. LSG Niedersachsen, 8/30/95, L 4 Kr. 11/95, 3 Breithaupt 1996, No. 42.
2. Fred C. v. Texas Health and Human Serv. Comm'n, 924 F. Supp. 788, 793
(W.D.Tex. 1996), vacated by 117 F.3d. 1416 (5th Cir. 1997).
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gery. They share that misfortune with thousands up and down the
country. I only hope that they have not been encouraged to think that
these proceedings offered any real prospects that this court could en-
hance the standards of the National Health Service, because any such
encouragement would be based upon manifest illusion.
3
1. Introduction
This Article is a comparative study of the law's role in rationing
health care in the United States, Germany, and Britain. More particularly,
it examines the role of the courts and of other institutions through which
these countries resolve disputes and protect rights in the context of health
care resource allocation. It begins with a consideration of the role of law
in health care relationships as a prologue to a discussion of law's role in
resolving claims to health care resources. It next presents the problem of
allocation of health care resources in the face of uncertainty and growing
demands, and introduces the part law plays in this process. The focus then
turns to the unique role of legal processes in each of the systems: the Ger-
man social insurance system based on negotiated allocation of resources in
a framework of legal obligations and rights; the British National Health
Service, based on discretionary allocation of a fixed budget by payors and
providers; the American public insurance system based on legal entitle-
ments; and the American private insurance system based on contract with
an ever more significant statutory overlay. It concludes with general re-
flections on the role of the courts and other dispute resolution mechanisms
in health care resource allocation.
II. The Legal Dimension of Health Care Relationships
The relationships through which health care is provided and received
have three important dimensions. Most obviously, perhaps, health care is
delivered within professional relationships. One person, a professional,
ministers to another person, a patient. The professional is entrusted with
extensive authority over and responsibility for the patient, both on the basis
of special education, training, and experience which allows the profes-
sional to understand and treat the patient's medical problems and because
the ethical framework in which the professional operates is supposed to as-
3. R v. Secretary of State for Social Services, ex parte Hincks, 1 BMLR 93 (Ct. of
App. 1980) (Opinion of Bridge, L.J.).
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sure the professional's allegiance to the patient 4 Traditionally the patient
was, as the word indicates, the passive party in the relationship. The pa-
tient trusted and was ministered to.' In recent years the patient has be-
come, at least in theory, a more active participant in the relationship. The
patient is supposed to be educated regarding proposed interventions and
their alternatives, and to consent to interventions before they occur.6 The
patient has more control over his life and over the timing of his death. In
reality, however, in the context of the professional-patient relationship, the
professional still is largely in control.!
Second, the relationships through which health care is provided are
also economic.8 The provider of health care is a merchant selling goods
and services. The patient is a consumer. The patient, or the patient's in-
surer or employer, or the government, is a purchaser. Health care is a
product provided in a market. Health care markets are governed by the
laws of economics. Providers respond to incentives, providing more care
when they are paid on a fee-for-service basis, and less when they are paid
on a capitated or salary basis.9 This has always been so, but we in the
United States have become much more acutely aware of health care's eco-
nomic aspect in recent years.10 Other countries are also discovering this
4. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE, 4-17
(1982). Historically, health care institutions were also entrusted with the care of pa-
tients. They were sponsored by churches or by communities and supported by charitable
contributions. They existed to provide a context in which professionals could provide
care, not to make profit.
5. See Bradford H. Gray, Trust and Trustworthy Care in the Managed Care Era, 16
HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 34, 35.
6. BARRY R. FuRRow, ET AL., 1 HEALTH LAW §§ 6-9, 6-11 (1995) [hereinafter "I
HEALTH LAW"].
7. Id. at §§ 6-17, 6-19.
8. The literature on health economics is vast and rapidly growing. The classic
source is Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REv. 941 (1963).
9. See Alan Hillman, Mark Pauly, & Joseph Kerstein, How do Financial Incentives
Affect Physicians' Clinical Decisions and the Financial Performance of Health Mainte-
nance Organizations? 321 NEWENG. J. MED. 86 (1989). Health care institutions are also
driven by the profit motive: for-profit entities seek profits for their shareholders; non-
profit entities strive for prestige and growth and make sure their managers and medical
staff are well provisioned.
10. See STARR, supra note 4, at 420-36; see, among the many proposals for reform-
ing health care, acknowledging its economic dimension, ALMN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH
PLAN (1990); Mark V. Pauly, et al., Incremental Steps Toward Health System Reform,
HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 125.
1998]
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dimension of health care, although their responses to health care markets
are very different from our own.1
In the market environment, the purchaser of services has considerable
power. The purchaser is often not the consumer (the patient), however, but
the consumer's employer, or an insurer, or the government.' The interests
of the purchaser are independent of, and not always aligned with, those of
the patient. While the sick patient may want every medical intervention
that may be of benefit, for example, the insurer, who actually pays for
medical care, must marshall its resources carefully to assure that all of its
insureds can be served, its premiums remain competitive, and its managers
and shareholders are well compensated. 3 Providers may be less powerful
as sellers than they are as professionals, but they are far from powerless.
They have a valuable commodity to sell, and often sell it under restricted
market conditions where they are not exposed to the full force of competi-
tion.1 4 Under some market structures, moreover, the consumer is also not
powerless, although the consumer is often the weakest participant in health
care markets.
15
Health care provision relationships also exist, finally,, in a third di-
mension-they are legal relationships. In every country, legislatures have
adopted a complex web of statutes that establish the framework in which
health care is delivered. These statutes, for example, govern the licensing
of professionals and institutions, the financing and expenditures of social
insurance or national health service programs, the funding of health care
education and research, and the protection of public health.16 In nations
11. See, e.g., HEALTH CARE REFORM (Chris Ham, ed. 1997); LAURENE A. GRAIG,
HEALTH OF NATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON U.S. HEALTH CARE REFORM
(1993) (discussing health care reforms currently underway in other developed countries,
including market-based reforms).
12. In 1995, 20.8% of personal health care expenditures were out-of-pocket. Private
health insurance paid 31.5% of health expenditures, the government 44.6%. Katharine
R. Levit, et al., National Health Expenditures, 1995, 18 HEALTH CARE FrNANCINa REV.
175, 205 (1996). During 1994, 85.5% of privately insured Americans were insured
through employer-related coverage. See HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,
SOURCE BOOK ON HEALTH INSURANCE DATA, 1996, 13 (1997) [hereinafter "HIAA"].
13. This conflict has been recognized by the federal courts in private health insur-
ance coverage litigation in the United States. See cases cited infra at notes 411 through
417.
14. See OCCUPATIONAL LICENsURE AND REGULATION, 7-9 (Simon Rottenberg ed.,
1980).
15. See ENTHOVEN, supra note 10, and Pauly et al., supra note 10, for proposals to
empower consumers in health care markets.
16. See Medical Law, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW (Hen-nan Nys, ed.)
(national monographs discussing how these issues are addressed in various nations).
[Vol. 21:639
Health Care Rationing in the Courts
with federal government structures, such as the United States and Ger-
many, health laws exist at both the national and state level, and interact
with each other in complex ways. In some countries, constitutions cabin
the discretion that lawmakers have for designing these systems.
Administrative agencies also play an active role in most health care
systems, regulating professionals and institutions and managing public
programs for health care purchasing and provision. Agencies issue rules
and make adjudications that govern health care relationships. Finally, in
most countries the courts also oversee health care relationships by review-
ing and enforcing the decisions of administrative care agencies, interpret-
ing and enforcing contracts, and protecting those who suffer tortious or
criminal injury.
1 7
It is not surprising that health care relationships have a legal dimen-
sion. Even the most private relationships, those within families, have a
public, legal dimension. The extent and density of legal intervention in
health care, however, is sufficiently remarkable to require explanation.
The law intervenes in health care relationships because of deficiencies that
exist in professional-patient or market relationships.'8 The courts are
available to hear malpractice claims, for example, because professionals
sometimes culpably harm rather than help patients. Licensing laws exist,
at least in theory, because not all persons who would hold themselves out
as professionals in fact meet minimal standards of competence and ethical
conduct. Laws establish public health care financing programs because
markets are only capable of making medical goods and services available
to those who have money to exchange for those goods and services. Fraud
and abuse laws penalize excessive and inappropriate responses of provid-
ers to the incentives offered by economic arrangements.
The legal structures through which diverse countries organize their
health care systems vary greatly. They are products of different histories
and different policy desiderata, and respond to different professional and
17. In many countries, including the United States, quasi-public entities exercise
delegated power in governing or resolving disputes in health care relationships. The
Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, for example, is one of
the most important regulatory agencies in the American health care system, while the
German Krankenkassen and Kassendrztliche ereinigungen, although technically not
government agencies, run the statutory health insurance system.
18. See Timothy S. lost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation,
Management, or the Market?, 37 ARiz. L. REV. 825 (1995); Timothy S. Jost, The Neces-
sary and Proper Role of Regulation to Assure the Quality of Health Care, 25 Hous. L.
REv. 525 (1988). Alternatively, laws exist because those who lack power in profes-
sional-patient relationships or economic relationships sometimes possess political power
or are able to appeal to a court or agency's sense ofjustice.
1998]
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economic arrangements. Nevertheless, legal institutions in -various coun-
tries are more or less comparable; the problems and issues they address in
health care are in many respects similar, and the legal structures and tech-
niques nations have developed for addressing these problems and issues
share regular patterns. Cross-national comparative analysis of legal struc-
tures in health care is both possible and instructive.
Among the most important functions that law serves in societies gen-
erally are resolution of disputes and articulation and protection of the
rights of individuals. These functions are of course closely related, as dis-
putes involve conflicting assertions of rights. In most countries courts are
primarily responsible for these functions. It is the task of courts to attend
to particular disputes, while legislatures and rulemaking bodies concern
themselves with policymaking in general.' 9 However, other fora, such as
administrative courts or arbitration or mediation panels, also play an im-
portant role in some nations in dealing with particular disputes. This Arti-
cle focuses in particular on the role of courts and alternative dispute reso-
lution mechanisms in health care systems. More specifically, it focuses on
the part these institutions play in resolving disputes regarding resource al-
location.
I. Law and the Allocation of Health Care Resources
One of the most important tasks facing modem health care systems is
resource allocation. Health care resources must be allocated within health
care systems in a context of scarcity and uncertainty. Health care re-
sources are allocated through both professional and economic decisions.
But the results reached through these mechanisms often cause disputes.
These disputes are frequently resolved through legal institutions, and
through the courts in particular.
By definition, all valuable resources are scarce, but awareness of
scarcity in health care has become more acute in recent years as the de-
mand for health care has increased. The proportion of national wealth that
most developed nations spend on health care has increased in the past two
decades.
20
The most important factor driving health care cost increases through-
out the world, and particularly in the United States, is the continual prog-
19. See Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353
(1978).
20. George J. Schieber, Jean-Pierre Poullier, & Leslie M. Greenwald, Health System
Performance in OECD Countries, 1980-1992, 13 HEALTH AFF., Fall 1994, at 100, 101.
[Vol. 21:639
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ress of medical technology.2 1 Health care is very labor intensive, often
demanding expensive, skilled labor. Unlike other industries, capital in-
vestment and technological development rarely result in substantial savings
of labor costs in the health care industry. The demand for health care
technology is likely to continue to increase.
Another important factor inexorably driving the increase in the de-
mand for medical care in the long run is the aging of the population. In
developed countries, two trends are simultaneously increasing the average
age of the population: people are living longer, and the birth rate is de-
clining; thus at any one time there are more older people and fewer
younger people?2 Assuming that most persons require periodic medical
care, a longer life means a greater aggregate need for medical care. The
chronic and degenerative conditions that accompany old age also result
often in a greater need for medical care later in life, including in many in-
stances the need for long term nursing care. Death is itself expensive, es-
pecially if it is repeatedly staved off. Moreover, the aging of the popula-
tion not only increases the cost of a health care system, but also decreases
its income, because older persons are less likely to be paying social insur-
ance premiums or taxes to finance the services that they consume in ever-
increasing volume. This inevitably leads to an imbalance of payments and
income in social insurance funds or national health services, and to in-
creased premium or tax levels.
Finally, other factors also contribute to health care cost increases.
Administrative costs in health care are high and continually growing.
Waste and abuse are costly and difficult to control 3 For all of these rea-
sons, demand for resources in health care is likely to continue to increase.
There seem to be limits, however, to the extent to which developed
nations are willing to dedicate resources to health care. Virtually every
21. Joseph P. Newhouse, An Iconoclastic View of Health Care Cost Containment, 12
HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 152; Einer Elhauge, The Limited Regulatory Potential of
Medical Technology Assessment, 82 VA. L. REv. 1525 (1996).
22. See Gesundheitswesen in Deutschland, Kostenfaktor und Zukunftsbranche, in
SACHVERSTA IDIGENRAT FOR DME KONZERTIERTE AKTnON IM G.SUNDHEITSwEsEN (Sonder-
gutachten ed., Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996). Aging of the population is a less im-
portant factor in explaining health care cost growth in the United States, but as the baby-
boom generation reaches retirement age in the early twenty-first century, it is likely to
become a more significant factor. Daniel N. Mendelson and William B. Schwartz, The
Effects ofAging and Population Growth on Health Care Costs, 12 HEALTH AFF., Spring
1993, at 119.
23. See Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and
Reforming Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Healthcare Spending, 11 YALE J. REG. 456
(1994).
1998]
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developed nation is currently engaged in a more or less urgent debate re-
garding "health care reform," i.e., how to control the escalating costs of
health care.24 Inevitably this discussion turns to how to allocate increas-
ingly constrained resources within health care systems.
For the past two generations, scarce resources have been allocated
both to and within health care systems on the basis of professional judg-
ment.25 Health care professionals, and in particular physicians, have de-
termined, on the basis of their professional training and experience, what
diagnostic and treatment modalities would benefit their patients. In the era
of fee-for-service medicine, which existed both in the United States and
Germany until the recent past, the decision of a physician that a patient re-
quired a service usually meant that the service would be provided. Even
British National Health Service resource allocation decisions, within the
context of the national health budget, were until recently largely controlled
by professionals.
26
These decisions regarding allocation of scarce health care resources,
however, have been and continue to be made in a context of uncertainty.
Though medicine is scientifically based, many medical procedures are not
scientifically validated. There are significant variations in the use of
medical procedures from country to country and from community to com-
munity within countries.27 Even the way in which diseases are conceptu-
alized varies from country to country.2  Although outcomes studies are
being pursued and practice guidelines formulated to reduce his variation,
they still leave much of the territory of professional practice uncovered,
and can offer only statistical probabilities, not specify what care is appro-
priate in particular cases.2 9 Professional judgments regarding resource al-
24. See sources cited supra note 11.
25. See Elhauge, supra note 21, at 1536-47; Clark C. Havighurst & James F. Blum-
stein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The Role oJ'PSROs, 70 Nw.
L. REV. 6, 25-30 (1975).
26. S. Harrison, A Policy Agenda for Health Care Rationing, in RATIONING HEALTH
CARE 885, 889 (R.J. Maxwell, ed. 1995).
27. LYNN PAYER, MEDICINE & CuLTuRE: VARIETIEs OF TREATMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES, ENGLAND, GERMANY, AND FRANCE (1988); John E. Wennberg, Dealing with
Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for Action, 3 HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 6,
9.
28. See PAYER, supra note 27.
29. Arnold M. Epstein, The Outcomes Movement-Will it Get us Where we Want to
go?, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 266 (1990); David M. Eddy & John Billings, The Quality of
Medical Evidence: Implications for Quality of Care, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1988, at 19.
See also Sandra J. Tanenbalim, Knowing and Acting in Medical Practice: The Episte-
mological Politics of Outcomes Research, 19 J. HEALTH POL., PoL'Y & L. 27 (1994)
(noting that doctors do not think in terms of statistical probabilities in making decisions),
[Vol. 21:639
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location do not, therefore, reach predictable or even consistent results.
Professional judgment as the basis of resource allocation tends to benefit
some patients, but slights the needs of others.30 Perhaps more importantly,
professional judgments also err on the side of providing more, rather than
fewer, procedures, as there is virtually no limit to the resources that can be
allocated to health care with some beneficial effect.3 ' In the end, therefore,
professional judgment must be supplemented, limited, and directed by
other forms of decision-making that serve other ends.
Decisions allocating health care resources allocation are also, and
ever more prominently, economic decisions. In most sectors of the econ-
omy, innumerable individual purchasing decisions determine the ultimate
allocation of resources. These purchasers, applying their own value cal-
culations, make discrete purchases, which in aggregate determine resource
allocation within an economy. Uncertainty as to value is, therefore, a
problem for individuals, not for society. It has long been believed, how-
ever, that individual purchasing decisions also have their limits as a re-
source allocation tool in health care markets.32 For this reason, markets
have traditionally played only a limited role in health care resource alloca-
tion.
For market forces to work, purchasers must be relatively well in-
formed. They must be able to evaluate the capacity of the product to meet
their needs and to weigh comparatively a range of products with differing
prices and values. Most consumers have a limited ability to judge their
need for medical care and an even more limited capacity for evaluating
30. A fascinating example of this is the waiting lists of the national health service. It
is well known that in Britain scarce health resources are allocated by the assignment of
patients to waiting lists through professional judgment. Year after year, however, these
waiting lists tend to limited to patients with "varicose veins, hernias, painful or immobile
joints, cataracts and enlarged tonsils, or they are women awaiting sterilization." STEPHEN
FRANKEL AND ROBERT WEST, RATIONING AND RATIONALITY IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH
SERvIcE: TiE PERSIsTENCE OF WArNG LisTs 6 (1993). What these conditions have in
common is that they are of little interest to doctors-the procedures that address them are
routine, boring, and have little research potential. Ma at 7-12. They are thus continually
shoved behind more glamorous and interesting conditions and procedures. See also
David Hughes & Lesley Griffiths, "Ruling in" and "Ruling Out": Two Approaches to
the Micro-Rationing of Health Care, 44 Soc. SC. MED. 359 (1997) (describing doctor's
decision-making behavior in deciding who gets cardiac surgery or neurological rehabili-
tation services in British NHS units.)
31. See Elhauge, supra note 21, at 1547.
31 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFCE, ECONOMC IpeUCATIONS OF RISING HEALTH
CARE CosTs (1992) [hereinafter "CBO"] (discussing basic failures in health care mar-
kets.)
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particular medical goods and services.33 Not only, as noted above, are ob-
jective standards often lacking to this end, but even the standards that exist
are not readily understandable by consumers. In fact, consumers have tra-
ditionally depended on providers, especially physicians, to act as agents in
advising them what and how much medical care they need.3 ' It is only to
be expected, however, that permitting suppliers to direct pu:rchasing deci-
sions will result in excess demand. An additional obstacle to relying on
the decisions of individual consumers to reach an efficient allocation of
health care resources is the prevalence of health insurance? 5 Individual
instances of the use of medical care are often very expensive, and are un-
certain in frequency and extent. The high cost of medical care makes it
difficult for most persons to pay for anything other than routine health care
out of current income.s6 Moreover, most persons are risk averse, and are
willing to pay sizable insurance premiums to avoid the uncertain risk of
catastrophic liability for medical care costs. Further, most nations have
concluded that individual health is a benefit to the state and that because
poor health is a risk to which all are exposed, its costs should be borne by
all.37 Thus, in all developed countries, health care is to a greater or lesser
degree financed by society or by the state. For all of these reasons, medi-
cal care tends in most countries to be covered by insurance, either soial
insurance provided by the community or by commercial insurance.
Insurance, however, permits individuals to obtain heallh care at less
than market cost (often without cost altogether). This results in moral haz-
ard: insureds obtain health care of questionable value, that they would
probably not purchase themselves at full cost, because the care is essen-
tially free. 8 But it is not free, of course. All insureds must collectively
33. Id. at 13.
34. Id. at 13-14.
35. Id. at 17-18.
36. The uncertain occurrence and tremendous and unpredictable variation of medical
care costs make financing through individual savings problematic. In 1996 and 1997,
Congress adopted legislation encouraging experimentation with medical savings accounts
(MSAs) to stimulate market competition in health care by encouraging consumers to pay
for health care out of special savings accounts. Whether MSAs in fact will result in a
reduction of medical costs, however, is strongly contested. Compare Pauly, supra note
10, with J. SHIELS, ET AL., CHANGES IN MEDICARE PROGRAM SPENDING UNDER
ALTERNATIVE MEDICAL SAVINGS AccouNT MODELS (1995). Debt financing of health
care, though common in the United States, puts providers at high risk, particularly when
they provide care for the elderly.
37. DIANE LONGLEY, HEALTH CARE CoNsTITroNS 1 (1996).
38. See Arrow, supra note 8 at 961-62; CBO, supra note 32 at 17-18. Insured per-
sons face incentives to use more health care than they actually "need" either because they
do not understand how to use health care appropriately or because the insured may derive
[Vol. 21:639
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pay for it. The availability of insurance also lowers the cost to the individ-
ual of non-compliance with treatment requirements, again often imposing
costs on the community. On the provider side, insurance encourages pro-
fessionals to expand the demand for their services-to resolve uncertainty
in favor of action-particularly where insurance pays the provider on a
per-service basis. 9 Where insurance pays on a charge or cost basis (as was
formerly often the case in many countries) not only the volume of services,
but also the price of services expands continually4 In sum, the prevalence
of insurance builds on the other market failures already present to weaken
the incentives that individual consumers face for limiting their own de-
mand for services, while at the same time creating incentives for providers
to encourage increased demand for health care resources.
The limited ability of individual consumers to assure the efficient use
of health care resources is only one problem with relying on markets to
allocate resources in health care.4! Another problem is that markets can-
not, without more, reach an equitable allocation of health care resources.
Markets require purchasers with purchasing power. Insured consumers
have such power (within the limits of their insurance policies), but in most
countries a significant proportion of the population lacks the money that
would be needed to pay the full premiums of insurance out of their own
funds. In the United States, for example, nineteen percent of the adult
population currently lack health insurance, and most of these are not in-
sured because they cannot afford it.42 All developed countries, therefore,
have created either social insurance systems or national health insurance
systems to assure equitable access to health care. In the United States,
over one %arter of the population are covered by public health insurance
programs.
an advantage from the medical service beyond its actual benefit for improving health
(such as paid release from work, gratification of a drug dependency, satisfaction of an
abnormal psychiatric need for medical treatment, for example).
39. Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 25, at 27-28.
40. PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REvIEw COMMIssION, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDICARE
PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REFORM: AN AGENDA FOR AcTION 26-28 (1987) [hereinafter
"PPRC"J.
41. See, discussing other concerns regarding market-based approaches to reforming
health care delivery and finance, Thomas Rice, Can Markets Give us the Health System
we Want?, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 383 (1997); Robert G. Evans, Going for the
Gold: The Redistributive Agenda behind Market-Based Health Care Reform, 22 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 427 (1997).
42. Karen Donelan, et al., Whatever Happened to the Health Insurance Crisis in the
United States, 276 JAMA 1346 (1996).
43. HIAA, supra note 12, at 13.
19981
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Even if we cannot, in the end, rely totally on the decisions of individ-
ual consumers to allocate resources in health care, markets nonetheless
play a key and ever more important role in resource allocation. As noted
earlier, the real purchasers of health care are often not patients, but em-
ployers who purchase health insurance and insurers, managed care organi-
zations, or health benefit plan administrators who purchase health services.
These purchasers are increasingly aware of their market power and in-
creasingly savvy in bringing it to bear on resource allocation decisions.
44
The interests of purchasers, however, are not necessarily congruent with
the interests of consumers (patients), on the one hand, and are often con-
trary to the interests of providers, on the other. Economic resource alloca-
tion decision-making, therefore, often result in conflicts that must be re-
solved through other means.
45
In developed nations, professional judgment and economic decisions
interact in complex ways to yield health care resource allocation decisions.
Many actors play a role in resolving uncertainty in health care. First, and
most obviously, individual professionals continue constantly to make deci-
sions as to the appropriateness and necessity of the use of health care re-
sources in particular situations, based of course on professional judgment,
but also with an eye to economic limitations, and incentives. Second,
health care institutions make resource allocation decisions, both by decid-
ing how to allocate resources among particular types of equipment or fa-
cilities, and, in many countries, by allocating resources among particular
patients.46 Again, these decisions are influenced both by economic con-
cerns and by pressure from the professionals that practice within the insti-
tutions. Third, purchasers and insurance administrators make resource al-
location decisions.47 In the United States, for example, employers that
44. See, e.g., PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMMISSION, ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN
MANAGED CARE PLANS AND PHYSICIANS (1995) (describing arrangements through which
managed care organizations purchase services from physicians); Elizabeth W. Hoy, et al.,
A Guide to Facilitating Consumer Choice, 15 HEALTH AFF., Winter 1996, at 9 (describ-
ing health care purchasing arrangements of major corporations).
45. See, e.g., discussing conflict resolution issues in managed care, Eleanor D. Kin-
ney, Resolving Consumer Grievances in a Managed Care Environment, 6 HEALTH
MATIX 147 (1996); Marc A. Rodwin, Managed Care and Consumer Protection: What
are the Issues?, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1007 (1996).
46. This is obviously true in public health systems such as the British National
Health Service, but is also true in the United States as well. See ANSELM STRAUSS, ET
AL., SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF MEDICAL WORK 189 (1985) (describing resource alloca-
tion processes in American health care institutions).
47. See Emily Friedman, Managed Care, Rationing and Quality: A Tangled Rela-
tionship, 16 HEALTH AFF., May-June 1997, at 174.
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provide health insurance as an employment benefit negotiate policy cover-
age with health insurers and managed care organizations.4' In most coun-
tries, governments are major purchasers of health care services, and make
resource allocation decisions accordingly. In Britain, District Health
Authorities and Fundholding General Practices establish resource alloca-
tion priorities by negotiating coverage contracts with hospitals. 9
Governments also make resource allocation decisions, however, in
their role as legislators, administrators, and adjudicators. That is to say,
law also plays a major role in resource allocation decisions. The serious
limitations of both professional judgment and economic decision-making
necessitate the existence of legal frameworks to address and protect con-
cerns otherwise slighted.
One of the most important functions of governments in the resource
allocation context is to address the disputes that inevitably arise when re-
source allocation decisions are made by professionals or purchasers. In-
surers deny coverage for services that patients desire or deny payment for
services that doctors have provided. Hospitals lack facilities that some pa-
tients consider essential. Government national health services fail to pro-
vide services that patients believe they need. In these circumstances,
claims often end up before courts. In some countries, other fora are also
available to consider these disputes. How these courts and other fora re-
spond to these disputes in three different countries is the focus of concern
in this Article. Before we turn to the details, however, we will first briefly
describe the health care systems of the countries we will study.
IV. National Models for Financing Health Care
The countries we will consider represent the three major models of
health care financing found in developed nations. Historically, the earliest
model is the social insurance model, exemplified here by the German
health insurance system.50 Under this model, employers and employees are
required to pay premiums (payroll taxes) to statutory insurance funds,
which in turn pay for medical care. By this means, more or less universal
insurance coverage is extended to employees and to related groups, such as
48. See Gail A. Jensen, et al., The New Dominance of Managed Care: Insurance
Trends in the 1990s, 16 HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 125 (describing employers ar-
rangements with insurers and managed care plans).
49. See JoHN OVRETErr, PURCHASING FOR HEALTH (1995).
50. See generally RICHARD KNOX, GERMANY's HEALTH SYSTEM: ONE NATION,
UNITED wrrH HEALTH CARE FOR ALL (1993); John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report:
Germany's Health Care System, 324 N. ENG. J. MED. 503, 1750 (1991).
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employees' dependents and former employees who are now retired, dis-
abled, or unemployed. 51 Framework laws normally guide social insurance
programs by defining program coverage and regulating payments to pro-
viders. This Article examines, as exemplars of legal approaches to conflict
resolution within social insurance systems, four of the most common types
of disputes that arise within the German health care system: disputes in-
volving the coverage of medical equipment,52 disputes involving coverage
of alternative (complementary) medicine,53 disputes involving utilization
review of the services provided by individual physicians, 54 and disputes in-
volving the fixing of budgets for physician and hospital services.
5
A second possibility is provision of tax-financed medical care by the
state, exemplified here first by the British National Health Service.5 6 Di-
rect provision could be accomplished through government ownership of
health care facilities and employment of health care professionals. This is
not necessary, however, and in tax-financed systems a mixture of public
and private provision often exists. 57 The direct payment model commonly
involves the state most intensely in direction of the payment amd provision
of medical care. This Article will consider resolution of coverage disputes
involving individual patients and institutional providers in the National
Health Service.58
This article also examines coverage disputes in the American Medi-
care and Medicaid programs as further examples of public health care fi-
nancing.59 Medicare resembles closely European social insurance systems,
while Medicaid is a tax-financed system. These programs are unlike both
51. See Eckhard Bloch, Kreis der versicherten Personen, in HANDBUCH DES
SOZIALVERSICHERUNGSRECHTS, BAND 1, KRANKENVERSICHERUNGSRECHT 485 (Bertram
Schulin ed., 1994) (describing covered groups) [hereinafter "HANDBUCH SVR"I].
52. See infra text accompanying notes 108-29.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 130-60.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 161-219.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 220-44.
56. Although this Article refers throughout to the British National Health Service,
there are some differences in administration of the NHS between England and the rest of
Britain, and, where these exist, we describe the English variant. See, describing the
NHS, JuDITH ALLSOP, HEALTH POLICY AND THE NHS TowARDs 2000 (2d ed. 1995);
CHRISTOPHER HAM, HEALTH POLICY IN BRrTAiN (3rd ed. 1992).
57. In Britain, for example, the NHS is financed from central tax revenues, purchas-
ing decisions are made at the district level by government health authorities, secondary
and tertiary care are provided by non-profit "NHS trusts," and primary care is delivered
by private general practitioners who contract with the government.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 261-84.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 287-380.
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the German and British systems, however, in that coverage is an entitle-
ment, not limited by a budget. This affects the nature of coverage disputes.
The third approach considered here is commercial or private health
insurance. Private health insurance is available in virtually all developed
nations. However, few nations (most notably the United States), rely on
commercial insurance as a primary means of providing health care for the
population generally. While commercial insurance exists technically by
virtue of private arrangements, the relationships between insurers, in-
sureds, and providers (including, under some circumstances, premium
rates) are usually regulated by thejovemment and commercial insurance is
in some countries tax subsidized. This Article examines one of the most
common contexts in which commercial insurance disputes come before le-
gal tribunals: the resolution of coverage disputes involving private health
insurers in the United States, focusing in particular on disputes regarding
the necessity or experimental nature of treatment.
61
V. Germany: Social Courts and Arbitration Panels
The German health insurance program is an employment-based social
insurance system. When Bismarck originated the system in the nineteenth
century, its goal was to provide support for sick workers. 62 Over the past
century, however, the system has evolved into a comprehensive health in-
surance program, financing not only the health care needs of workers, but
also of their dependents and of formerly employed persons, be they retired,
disabled, or simply unemployed. All workers who earn less than DM
72,000 per year in the former western zone or DM 61,200 per year in the
former eastern zone (1996 figures) are legally obligated to be insured. 3
About eighty-eight percent of the population is currently enrolled in the
social insurance system, seventy-five percent being mandatory enrollees
60. In 1995, employer-provided health benefits were subsidized in the United States
to the extent of $90 billion. Alain C. Enthoven & Sara L Singer, Market-Based Reform:
What to Regulate and by Whom, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 105.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 381-435.
62. Iglehart, supra note 50, at 504-05; PETER ROSENBERG, THE ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT OF COMPULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE IN GERMANY, IN POLITICAL VALUES
AND HEALTH CARE: THE GERMAN EXPmENCE 105 (Donald W. Light and Alexander
Schuller, eds. 1986).
63. Reinhard Busse, et al., The Future Development of a Rights Based Approach to
Health Care in Germany: More Rights or Fewer? in HARD CHOICES IN HEALTH CARE,
21, 26 (Jo Lenaghan, ed. 1997).
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and their families and thirteen percent voluntary enrollees. 64 Nearly nine
percent of the population is covered by private health insurance and two
percent by government programs, and less than one percent are unin-
sured.65 Health insurance premiums for employees are paid half by the
worker and half by the employer.
66
The health insurance program is administered by self-governing,
quasi-public, non-profit health insurance funds (Krankenkassen, here re-
ferred to as KKn, or KK in the singular). There are several hundred KKn,
some of which are firm-specific (similar to our self-insured ERISA plans),
some occupation-specific (such as special funds for craft-workers, miners,
sailors, farmers), and some specific to particular geographic areas.67 His-
torically Germans had only a limited ability to choose among these funds,
but as of 1996, they have virtually unlimited freedom to choose among
available insurers.68 The populations insured by the various funds still
vary significantly in terms of their age, income, and health status. Al-
though Germany instituted a risk adjustment scheme several years ago to
transfer income among the funds to compensate for this variance, premi-
ums still vary from fund to fund.69 The funds are organized at the state and
federal level into associations.
Providers are also organized in corporate bodies. In particular, all
doctors who provide services to members of the sickness funds are mem-
bers of their state Kassendrztliche Vereinigung (KaV, plural KaVn), the
union of insurance doctors, 70 and all dentists are organized into the Kas-
senzahneirzliche Vereinigung (KzV).71 The hospitals are also organized at
64. Friedrich Schwartz and Reinhard Busse, Fixed Budgets in the Ambulatory Sec-
tor: the German Experience, in FIING HEALTH BUDGETS, 93, 95 (Friedrich Schwartz, et
al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter, "Fixing Health Budgets"].
65. BuNDEsmimnsTERiuM FOR GESUNDHEIT, DATEN DES GESuNDHErrswEsENs, 1995,
278.
66. § 249(1) SGB V (Sozialgesetzbuch chapter 5).
67. Busse, et al., supra note 63, at 26.
68. § 173 SGB V.
69. Busse, et al., supra note 63, at 27; see, describing the German risk adjustment
system, Ashley Files & Margaret Murray, German Risk Structure Compensation: En-
hancing Equity and Effectiveness, 32 INQUIRY 300 (1995). During the first 6 months of
1996, DM 10.4 billion was transferred through the risk adjustment mechanism, mainly
from the white collar insurance funds to the local, blue-collar, funds. See H. Korzilius,
Risikostrukturausgleich behindert Wettbewerb, 93 DEUTSCHES ARzTEBLATTA-2440
(1996).
70. §§ 77, 95 SGB V.
71. § 77 SGB V.
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the state and national level.72 The genius of the German system is that re-
sources for health care are allocated through the means of negotiations
between these corporate entities representing providers on the one side,
and the KKn, their organizational entities on the other, within a statutory
framework but without direct government intervention.
Three principles are at the base of German coverage and payment
policy. The first is a principle of comprehensiveness: the insurance system
covers a comprehensive list of preventive and curative health care services,
described below. The second is the Sachleistungsgrundsalz, or principle
of direct payment of providers by the KKn or by the provider corporate or-
ganizations which are in turn paid directly by the KKn." Until a 1997
amendment to the law, which is now being implemented, patients treated
by a doctor received no information as to what services the doctor had
billed for or how much he had billed. The level of these direct payments
are established through negotiations between the corporate organizations
and the KKn.74 These negotiations take place in the context of the third
principle, Beitragsstabilitdt, or premium stability." Health insurance pre-
miums are not supposed to rise faster than the incomes on which they are
based. Payments to providers, therefore, should not be more generous than
those that can be funded through stable premiums.
The German system of paying for health care is a result of the inter-
action of these principles. The principle of direct payment makes possible
the use of budgets. For the major sectors of health care (ambulatory physi-
cian care, hospital care, drugs, and dental care), resources are allocated
through budgets between representatives of the health insurance funds and
representatives of the providers. The regional KaVn, for example, have,
for the past twenty years, annually negotiated budgets with the sickness
funds for funding all physicians' services within the region. At first these
budgets were voluntary, and then from 1989 until 1997 they were manda-
tory.76 The budgets are negotiated with reference to the principle of pre-
mium stability, within guidelines established by the Concerted Action in
72. § 108a SGB V. This provision was added by the second Neuordnunggesetz of
1997. Prior to that time the hospital associations were private and had no legal status.
73. §2(2) SGB V. This principle is not absolute however, and various exceptions are
provided for indemnification. See Rechtliche Grundprinzipien der gesetzlichen Krank-
enversicherung und ihre Probleme, in HANDBUCH SVR, supra note 51, at 177, 211-24.
74. See, e.g., describing this process with respect to physician payment, Schwartz &
Busse, supra note 64.
75. §§ 71, 141(2) SGB V.
76. Schwartz & Busse, supra note 64, at 96-100.
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Health Care organization, an organization representing all of the major in-.• 77
terest groups in health care, established to guide these negotiations.
The KaVn pay doctors from these budgets on a fee-for-service basis
based on a national relative value scale, the Einheitlicher Berwer-
tungsmaflstab far drztliche Leistungen (EBM), which assigns a point value
to each procedure.78 The weight of points for particular services or spe-
cialties is further modified by each regional KaV using its own Honor-
verteilungsmafistab (HVM) to reach a total quarterly point value for each
member physician.79 These point numbers are summed to yield a total
number of points for all services billed during the quarter by all physicians
which is then divided into the quarterly budget to yield a point value.86
This point value is then multiplied by the number of points billed by each
doctor to determine the amount each particular doctor is paid. Under the
EBM implemented in 1996, payments are also limited on a per patient ba-
sis by what are known as praxisbudgets, subject to a variety of excep-
tions.81
Hospitals are also paid on a negotiated basis. The operating costs of
German hospitals have in recent years also been financed thr-ough budgets
negotiated with the KKn, while the capital costs have been financed by the
states.82 Operating costs are funded in part through diagnosis-determined
77. Id. at 97; § 87 SGB V.
78. Winfried Funk, Vertragarztrecht, in HAmNBUCH SVR, supra note 51, at 852,
888-90. Traditionally the EBM was further modified under the Bewerlungmaflstab/'dr
arztliche Leistungen (BMA) for the primary sickness insurance funds, which essentially
covered blue collar workers, and the Ersatzkassen Gebaihrordnung (E-GO) for the sub-
stitute funds, which provided somewhat more generous payments for the coverage of
white collar workers. Reimbursement is now essentially identical for both types of in-
surance.
79. Id. at 892. Each regional KaV establishes its own HVM for dividing up its own
budget, and in some regions separate sub-budgets are established for various specialties,
resulting in different specialists receiving more or less per point billed than others. See
GONTHER SCHNEIDER, HANDBUCH DES KASSENARzTRECHTS 435-41 (1994).
80. Klaus-Dirk Henke, et al., Global Budgeting in Germany: Lessons for the United
States, HEALTH ArF., Fall 1994, at 7-21. In the recent past, moreover, attc:mpts have been
made to improve compensation for primary care physicians and to decrease payment for
technical services. There has also been a movement toward grouping some services,
which are billed together for a lump sum.
81. See Thomas Ballast, Mengenbegrenzung im EBM: Praxisbudgets, DIE
ERSATZKASSE, Dec. 1996, at 440.
82. A brief English description of the program is found in U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 1993 GERMAN HEALTH REFORms 32-34, 45-46 (1993). For an ex-
haustive description of the system, see KARL HEINz TuscHEN & MICHAEL QUAAS,
BUNDESPFLEGESATZVERORDNUNG: KOMMENTAR Mrr EINER UMFASSENDEN EINFOHRUNG IN
DAS RECHT DER KRANKENHAUSFINANZIERUNG (3. Auflage 1996).
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per-case (Fallpauschal) and procedure-specific (Sonderentgelt) pay-
ments.Y The classification scheme for these payments is established
through negotiations between the hospitals and regional KKn at the na-
tional level, while the payment level is based on KKn/hospital association
negotiations.' Hospital expenses for patients not covered by the case or
procedure specific payments, and other expenses, are covered by flexible
budgets negotiated between the individual hospitals and the KKn. s When
negotiations are unsuccessful in establishing budgets, disputes are often
submitted to arbitration panels, known as Schiedsstellen, discussed below.
The German health insurance system is actively supervised by a sys-
tem of special courts, the Sozialgerichte, or social courts. Individual dis-
putes regarding coverage of services or payment of providers and arbitra-
tion panel decisions are often appealed to the social courts." Sixty-nine
social courts of the first instance, which hear social insurance disputes,
exist throughout Germany. 7 Appeals from decisions of these disputes are
made to the Landessozialgerichte, which exist in each of the sixteen Ger-
man states.8 8 In some instances, appeals from the Landessozialgerichte
can be taken to the Bundessozialgericht (BSG), which sits in Kassell.89 In
1996, 131 of the 775 appeals resolved by the BSG involved sickness insur-
ance claims, and another ninety-eight involved the claims of insurance
doctors, making health insurance issues the second largest category of
cases decided by the BSG after pension cases. Germany is a civil law
country, and court decisions do not have precisely the same precedential
weight and effect that they have in the United States. Nevertheless, the de-
cisions of the social courts, and of the BSG in particular, are taken very se-
83. See TUSCHEN & QUAAS, supra note 82, at 72.
84. Id
85. IdL at 73-75.
86. See Peter Kummer, Das sozialgerichtliche Verfahren, in SOCIAmCHTsHAND-
BURCH 603 (Bernd Baron von Maydell and Franz Ruland eds., 1996). Germany has a
number of systems of special courts, in addition to its general jurisdiction civil and
criminal courts (headed by the Bundesgerichtshoj) and its constitutional court (the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht). These courts have jurisdiction over tax law, employment law,
administrative law and social law. See GEscHAFrSvERTELUNGsPLAN DES BUNDES-
SOZIALGERICHTS FOR DAS JAHR 1997, reprinted in 50 NEuE JURmsTIcHE Woc-ENscHRiFr
[NJW] 35* (1997).
87. Kummer, supra note 86, at 609-11.
88. Id. at 611-13.
89. Id at 613-15.
90. Dm TATIGKEr DES BuNDEssozrAwuicHTs im JAHRE 1996: ENE OBERsiCHr 29
(Bundessozialgericht ed., 1997).
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riously and play a major role in defining the contours and boundaries of
German health insurance law.
Panels of judges preside over the social courts. In the courts of the
first instance there are usually three judges, a professional judge and two
lay judges.91 In disputes regarding insurance coverage, one of the lay
judges represents insureds, and the other represents the employers. 92 In
matters concerning the relationship between health insurance companies
and insurance doctors, one of the lay judges represents the insurance com-
panies, the other the doctors; in matters concerning the internal relation-
ships of insurance doctors, both represent the doctors.93 At the state and
national social court level, the panel consists of three professional judges
and two lay judges. 94 The BSG is divided into a number of panels of
judges, called senates, each of which has jurisdiction over a particular
body of cases. The Sixth Senate, for example, hears disputes involving in-
surance doctors.
The courts hold oral proceedings in which the parties are often,
though not always, represented by attorneys, The judges take an active
role in the proceedings, interrogating the parties and their attorneys. They
have, in fact, an obligation to investigate the facts thoroughly, and to assist
the parties in effectively presenting their cases.95 Access to the social
courts has traditionally been free (though public law entities such as insur-
ance companies must pay a fee), and the victorious claimant has the possi-
bility of receiving his litigation costs from the losing insurance 6ompany.
96
Disputes involving social insurance programs end up, therefore, in court
with great frequency.
97
In general, the social courts have been very receptive to the claims of
insureds and providers. Benefit coverage claims, however, only come be-
fore the courts in marginal cases. As noted above, the KKn are required by
law to offer a comprehensive range of services. Social Insurance is gov-
erned by Sozialgesetzbuch V (the fifth Social Law Book, abbreviated SGB
V). Section 2 SGB V requires the Social Insurance Funds to make avail-
91. § 12(1) SGG (Sozialgerichtgesetz).
92. SGG § 12(2).
93. SGG § 12(3).
94. SGG §§ 33, 40.
95. Kummer, supra note 86, at 657-59.
96. Id. at 695-700.
97. During 1994, 178,636 complaints were filed in the social courts of the first in-
stance, 17,954 appeals filed in the Landessozialgerichten, and 713 appeals and 1511 re-
quests to file an appeal were filed in the BSG. Kummer, supra note 86, at 611, 612, 615.
Only a minority of these, of course, were health insurance cases.
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able to their insureds (usually through direct arrangements with providers)
the services listed in chapter 3 of SGB V.a The first section of chapter 3'
specifies as covered under the insurance program services for the preven-
tion, early diagnosis, and treatment, as well as rehabilitation services
needed to prevent or reduce a handicap or need for nursing care. The
chapter goes on to identify specifically medical care, dental care, medica-
tions, dressings, various therapists and treatments, medical devices, hospi-
tal care, and rehabilitation or occupational therapy as covered services for
the treatment of illness100 The statute imposes a general limitation that
services must be necessary and economically provided and must corre-
spond with the general state of medical knowledge and attend to medical
progress. 01 Additional sections impose a host of limitations on particular
procedures, including cost-sharing obligations that have increased signifi-
cantly under recent legislation. Payment for dental prostheses in particular
has been increasingly limited in recent years.
10 2
The structure of the German health care system, as described above,
minimizes opportunities for disputes between insureds and insurers or
between patients and providers over benefit coverage issues. The fee-for-
service physician payment system, for example, rewards physicians for de-
livering as many services as possible to their patients. The physician has
until recently also faced only limited incentives for controlling prescribing.
From 1993 until 1996, the law imposed budgets (first fixed, thereafter ne-
gotiated) on prescribing by region. 03 These prescribing limits only applied
to physicians as a group, however. Although they were substantially ex-
ceeded in 1996,104 sanctions for exceeding the limits have not in fact yet
been imposed. 0 5 Physicians who substantially exceed their peers in pro-
viding services or prescribing medications risk cutbacks in their payments
under the German utilization review system, discussed below. This only
98. § 2(1) SGB V.
99. § 1 SGBV.
100. § 27(1) SGB V.
101. § 2 SGB V.
102. § 30 SGB V.
103. GEmRAL AccoUNTING OFFIc, PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING CoNmoLs (1994);
Reinhard Busse & Chris Howorth, Fixed Budgets in the Pharmaceutical Sector in Ger-
many: Effects on Costs and Quality, in FIXNG HEALTH BUDGETS, supra note 64, at 109,
114-16.
104. Josef Maus, Massive Irzteproteste zeigen Wirkung, 93 DEUTSCHES ARZTELATT
A-3235 (1996).
105. For a discussion of the difficulties of imposing the sanctions, see Wolfgang
Spellbrink, Rechtsfolgen der Budgetiiberschreitung nach § 84 SGB , 15 MEDizNRwHT
65 (1997).
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occurs after relatively extreme limits are reached, however, and the in-
come-maximizing strategy of the individual physician is to provide the
greatest possible number of services up to point where utilization review is
triggered.
Other factors in addition to the payment system also limit conflicts
over insurance benefit coverage. Patients have essentially -free choice of
physician. Any patient refused services by a physician is flee to find an-
other. All insureds, moreover, have free choice of insurer as of January 1,
1996, and white collar employees have had free choice for much longer. °0
In the past, insurers have competed in terms of serving their insureds, in-
cluding making services available, rather than by limiting premiums.10 7 In-
surance companies, therefore, deny coverage requests only relatively infre-
quently.
A. Coverage Disputes: Hilfsmittel
Coverage disputes do arise, however, even in the German system.
One of the most common objects of coverage disputes is Hilfimittel, which
is covered by statutory health insurance under SGB section 33. Hilfsmittel
is roughly analogous to the category of durable medical equipment in the
United States, but includes more broadly, "[v]ision and hearing aids, pros-
theses, orthopedic and other medical equipment, that in particular cases is
necessary to assure the success of treatment of the sick or to compensate
for a disability, so long as the equipment is not an article used generally by
people in daily life (or excluded by other code sections)."' "0  Examples
from recent opinions include hand-held devices that detect color for the
blind or fax machines for the deaf.109 The BSG issued twenty published
decisions regarding Hilfsmittel between 1990 and 1996, making this area
one of the most hotly contested areas considered by the BSG.
Cases normally come to the court when an insured requests coverage
of a particular device from a KK and the request is denied. Because KKn
rarely deny coverage with respect to other treatments and services, it is cu-
106. See Johann Behrens, Die Freiheit der Wahl und die Sicherung der Qualitat (Ver-
such einer Antwort auf [nicht nurl amerikanische Fragen), in GEsUND-EITssYsTEMENT-
WICKLUNG rN DEN USA uND DEUTSCHLAND 197, 199 (Johann Behrens et al. eds., Nomos
Verlagsges.ellschaft 1996).
107. See Sabine Richard & Karl-Heinz Sch6nbach, German Sickness Funds under
Fixed Budgets, in FIXiNG HEALTH BUDGETS, supra note 64, at 187, 191 (describing com-
petition among sickness funds to offer more services).
108. § 33 SGB V.
109. BSG, 1/17/96, 3 RK 39/94, SozR 3-2500, § 33, No. 19 (fax machine); BSG,
1/17/96, 3 RK 38/94; SozR 3-2500, § 33, No. 18 (color detection apparatus).
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rious that denials arise so often in this area. Disputes frequently involve
very expensive equipment, however, which often might be useful to sizable
categories of disabled persons (the blind, deaf, paralyzed, and so forth)." 0
Hilfsmittel disputes can be seen as test cases, therefore, involving poten-
tially large sums of money, and when the KKn believe that a denial is justi-
fied, appeals of the denial will be vigorously resisted by the KKn."'
The insureds win a surprising proportion of appellate decisions in-
volving Hilsmittel claims, and in many cases where the lower court up-
holds the KK denial of coverage, the appellate court remands for reconsid-
eration of additional factors not attended to by the lower court. The social
court decisions give only cursory attention to several statutory coverage
requirements. Although SGB V, section 128, requires the sickness funds
to publish jointly a list of covered Hilfsmittel, together with maximum
prices to be paid for each item, the courts routinely treat this list as advi-
sory rather than as binding; the fact that a specific item is not on the list is
of no consequence." 2 Second, although SGB section 33(1) on its face re-
quires that a device have curative potential and or completely compensate
for a handicap, the courts find this requirement satisfied if a device will
partially compensate for a handicap."
3
Disputes normally center around three other Hilfsmittel coverage re-
quirements. First the statute excludes coverage for objects requested by
handicapped persons that non-handicapped persons use regularly in their
daily life." 4 The question here is not whether the item is widely used-
glasses and hearing aids, for example, are covered despite the fact that mil-
lions of persons use them."' Rather, the question is whether the item is
widely used for non-medical purposes. The court tends to take a statistical
approach to this question. Computers (sought as perception or communi-
110. See, e.g., BSG, 216/97, 3 RK 1/96 (unpublished) (computer systems costing DM
9100 sought as communications device for handicapped child) (on file with author).
111. In some cases the KKn also resist paying for a piece of equipment, not because it
is not needed, but because some other entity (most often vocational rehabilitation insur-
ance) is responsible for paying for it. See, e.g., BSG, 7/26/94, 111 RAr 115/93, SozR 3-
2500 § 33, No. 10 (orthopedic shoes used only for work not covered by sickness funds).
112. See BSG, 1/17/96, 3 RK 16195, SozR. 3-2500, § 33, No. 20.
113. See id. (fact that air filter only made one room in dwelling suitable for handi-
capped person not decisive if room was bedroom and made it possible for person to
sleep.) The fact that the device does not directly substitute for a body part is also not
important, if the device in fact compensates indirectly for the loss of a bodily function);
BSG, 1/17196, 3 RK 38/94, Breithaupt 633 (1996) (color recognition device that does not
cure or totally compensate for blindness, but assists a blind person to perceive things).
114. § 33(1) SGBV.
115. BSG, 1/17/96, 3 RK39/94, SozR3-2500, § 33, No. 19.
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cation devices by the handicapped) were owned by twelve percent of the
population in 1995, and were thus held to be objects widely used in daily
life.!16 Fax machines (sought by a deaf person for communication) were
owned by only 2.3% of private persons in 1994, and were therefore held
not to be excluded.!17 Obviously, the extent of use of objects such as com-
puters and faxes changes over time, generally in the direction of moving
objects from covered to uncovered status as they become more widely used
by the general public. The coverage exclusion for widely used devices is
itself subject to two exceptions, however. First, even items that are in wide
use may be covered, at least in part, if they are very expensive and thus not
affordable by the insured." 8 Second, to the extent that items are similar to
items in general use, but cost more because they have been adapted for the
handicapped, such as hypoallergenic mattresses and pillows, the additional
costs will be covered."
A second requirement, found in SGB V section 12, provides that cov-
erage is extended only to items the coverage of which are cost-effective.
In applying this requirement, the BSG tends to perform a cost-benefit
analysis, considering both the cost of the item and how useful it would ac-
tually be to the handicapped person in practice.120 The fact that costs for
ever more sophisticated devices for aiding the handicapped have dropped
dramatically in recent years is relied on by the courts to support a continual
expansion of coverage for these devices. Indeed, sometimes the BSG ex-
plicitly acknowledges that it ruled against coverage of a particular device
when it was earlier disputed, but that costs have now dropped to the extent
that coverage is warranted.' 2 ' Also relevant in some of these cases are is-
sues of whether the item is in fact necessary, or whether it might be a lux-
ury. The BSG tends to interpret "need" expansively, however, finding that
116. BSG, 8/23/95, 3 RK 7/94, SozR 3-2500, § 33, No. 16. The BSG followed this
determination in a later case, 2/6/97, 3 RK 1/96 (unpublished).
117. BSG, 1/17/96, 3 RK 39/94, SozR 3-2500, § 33, No. 19.
118. BSG, 10115195, 1 RK 18/94, SozR3-2500, § 33.
119. BSG, 1/17/96, 3 RK 39/94, SozR 3-2500, § 33, No. 19 (though fax paid for by
insurance, costs of using it are similar to ordinary telephone costs, and must be paid by
insured); BSG, 1/25/95, 3/1 RK 63/93, SozR 3-2500, § 33 (bed adapted for handicapped
child covered).
120. BSG, 11/21/91, 1 RK 43/89, SozR 3-2500, § 33 No. 4 (electric reading device
that costs DM 5900). In some of these cases this consideration is almost mechanical, In
the color detection device case, the court found that the object would be used 10 times a
day, and was thus justified given its cost of DM 1470. BSG, 1/17/96, 3 RK 38/94.
121. See discussion of coverage of writing telephones for the deaf in I3SG, 10/25/95,
3 RK 30/94; SozR 3-2500, § 33, No. 17.
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the blind have a right to be able to read,122 that persons who are deaf have a
right not to be isolated from others, 123 and that persons who are paralyzed
have a right to move freely in the environment. 124 The BSG has also
found, moreover, that disabled persons have a right to have equipment pro-
vided to compensate for their handicaps rather than to be expected to rely
on family members or others around them for help.'2 Sometimes the BSG
invokes the human rights sections of the Constitution as a source of these
rights.
1 26
Finally, the BSG inquires under SGB V section 34 whether the items
are so inexpensive that they are readily affordable without insurance as-
sistance, or whether their therapeutic value is disputed. 27 Here again, the
court tends to be generous, rejecting, for example, the policy of a KK that
excluded a breast milk pump that cost DM 255 from coverage as an item of
minimal cost.128 On the other hand, the BSG has upheld exclusion of
hearing aid batteries, which are cheap enough to be affordable by most in-
sureds, and are covered by welfare for those who truly cannot afford
them.
129
In sum, the decisions of the social courts have continually supported
expansion of coverage in this area. This may explain, in part, why
Hilfsmittel costs have been one of the fastest growing areas of insurance
coverage.
B. Coverage Disputes: Alternative and Experimental Medicine
The decisions of the BSG also appear to be a factor in expanding cov-
erage of experimental and alternative medicine. On their face, the health
insurance sections of the German Social Code would appear to strictly
limit the services for which the health insurance funds are required to pay.
122. BSG, 8/23/95, 3 RK 7/95, SozR 3-2500, § 33, No. 16. The court also observed
in this case that to force a blind person to rely on others to read to him would violate his
constitutional right to privacy in communication.
123. BSG, 10/25/95, 3 RK 30/94, SozR 3-2500, § 33, No. 17.
124. BSG, 6/8/94, 3/1 RK 13/93, SozR 3-2500, § 33, No. 7.
125. BSG, 1/17/96, 3 RK 38/94, SozR 3-2500, § 33, No. 18. The Court also consid-
ers whether the device is necessary for assisting the handicapped for leading normal lives
in general, or whether it is rather needed to permit the pursuit of a particular vocation. If
an item is vocation specific, it is not the responsibility of the sickness funds, but might be
paid for by the vocational rehabilitation insurance program.
126. See BSG, 2/26/91, 8 Rkn 33/90, SozR 3-2500, § 33, No. 3 (constitutional right
of freedom of movement justifies payment for adaptive seat for auto).
127. § 34(4) SGB V.
128. BSG, 9/28/93, 1 RK 37/92, SozR 3-2500, § 34, No. 2.
129. BSG 6/8/94, 3/1 RK 54/93, SozR 3-2500, §33, No. 9.
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Section 2, which defines the scope of services generally, provides that
services must be provided effectively and economically, and only to the
extent necessary,' 10 further specifying that quality and efficiency of serv-
ices must comply with the general state of medical knowledge. 131 Section
12 states even more emphatically that providers may not provide, insureds
request, or insurers pay for services that are unnecessary or that are not
economically provided, a directive repeated in sections 70 and 72.132 Sec-
tion 28 again obligates doctors to provide services according to the stan-
dards of medical practice, while section 34 excludes payment for ineffec-
tive medications.' 3 Finally, section 135 provides that new diagnostic and
treatment methods may not be ordered at the cost of the sickness funds un-
til the Federal Commission of Insurance Doctors and Health Insurance
Funds at the request of a KaV or the federal organization of KKn has made
recommendations regarding the recognition of the new procedure and
qualifications for doctors who may deliver it.134 Under 1997 amendments
to the health insurance law, these recommendations must consider the
medical necessity and efficiency of the procedure as well as its effective-
ness.
135
The legislative history of the SGB supports a restrictive interpretation
of these provisions. The report accompanying the 1989 Health Reform
Law, the last major revision of coverage provisions, emphasized that pay-
ments by the health insurance funds must be limited to truly needed serv-
ices, specifically excluding services
... that are provided with methods that are not generally accepted.
New procedures, that are not sufficiently researched, or exotic treat-
ment methodologies (paraniedical procedures), that are recognized, but
that have not been proved, are not within the responsibility of the
health insurance funds. It is not the task of the health insurance funds
to finance medical research. This is also true when new methods in
particular Icases can lead to a healing of the disease or to a diminution
of a disability.'36
130. § 2(4) SGB V.
131. § 2(l) sGB V.
132. §§ 12(1), 70(10, 72(2) SGB V.
133. §§ 28(1), 34(2) SGB V.
134. § 135(1) SGB V; see ANDREAS SCHMIDT-ROGNiTz, DIE GEW ARUNG VON
ALTERNATIVEN SOWIE NEUEN BEHANDLUNGS-UND HEILMEHODEN DURCH DIE GESETZLICHE
KRANKENVERSICHERUNG 92-93, 96-97 (1996).
135. Horst Dieter Schirmer, Das Kassenarztrecht ir 2. GKV-Neuordnungsgesetz
-BGBL 1997 1S. 1520 -, 15 MEzNcRECHT 431, 447 (1997).
136. Bundestag Print, 11/2237, 148, 157.
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In practice, however, the restrictions imposed by SGB V, as inter-
preted by the BSG, are far less onerous than would first appear. As long as
a code exists under the EBM, the codebook under which procedures are
billed, a service can be provided and the doctor paid for it; it is subject
only to retrospective review for excessive provision of care under the
Wirtschaftlichkeitsprijfung process described below.137 The EBM applies
primarily to traditional medicine, however, and only covers new and ex-
perimental treatments to the extent they have been reviewed under the sec-
tion 135 new diagnostic and treatment procedure approval process.
Where services are either experimental or non-traditional, and thus
not yet recognized in the EBM, coverage policy becomes more compli-
cated, although the service may still ultimately be paid for by the KKn.' 3'
First, section 2 SGB V states that alternative therapeutical modalities can-
not be excluded from coverage. 139 Section 34, which deals with covered
drugs, refers to "alternative therapeutic modalities such as homeopathy,
phytotherapy, and antroposophy" and requires drugs from these therapeutic
modalities to be evaluated according to the standards of these modali-
ties.140 This section does not explicitly limit alternative therapeutic mo-
dalities to these three schools, however, and other schools of treatment
may be covered by sections 2 and 34. A provision in the recently adopted
1997 health reform law goes even further, amending section 135 to provide
that new procedures are supposed to be reviewed according to the state of
knowledge "in the particular school of therapy."'141 This provision was
clearly added to encourage the extension of coverage to non-traditional
-medicine.
The rulings of the BSG interpreting the coverage of alternative or ex-
perimental medicine have been complex and contradictory. For a decade,
the Third Senate of the BSG, which decides issues of coverage policy, has
137. See Bertram Schulin, Alternativ Medicin in der gesetzlichen Krankenversi-
cherung, 40 ZmTsc-mrT FOR SozulAlORM 546, 553 (1994).
138. See generally SCHMIDT-ROGNrrz, supra note 134.
139. § 2(1) SGB V.
140. § 34(2) SGB V; see also § 92(2) SGB V (requiring drug guidelines for drugs
from the separate therapy modalities to be evaluated by experts from these modalities).
For a description of these modalities, see Rtldiger Zuck, Der Standort der Besonderen
Therapierichtungen im deutschen Gesundheitswesen, 44 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WoCHmNscHRIFT 2933, 2934 (1991).
141. Zweites Gesetz zur Neuordnung von Selbstverwaltung und Eigenverantwortung
in der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung (2.GKV-NOG), § 50, to be codified at §
135(a)(1).1 SGB V. Alternative medical procedures, however, must be evaluated in
terms of their effectiveness, necessity, and efficiency, and must be evaluated in terms of
comprehensible scientific knowledge. Schirmer, supra note 135, at 447.
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recognized the extension of coverage to alternative or experimental treat-
ment methods in cases of severe illness of unknown origin where tradi-
tional treatment methods are ineffective or. where recognized treatments
are not appropriate for the particular case. 142 In either case, the court has
required a plausible case to be made that the treatment can be effective.
143
The court has been willing to order the sickness fund to indemnify the pa-
tient, however, where a disputed treatment proves in fact to be effective.
44
The 14a Senate also supported alternative medicine in a decision rejecting
the discipline of a dentist who refused to use amalgam fillings with mer-
cury in them because of his adherence to natural healing.145 The BSG re-
lied in this decision on the constitutional arguments discussed below. A
recent decision of the social appeals court for Lower Saxony went even
further, recognizing coverage for plausible alternative treatment, even
though the disease is not life threatening and traditional treatment may be
available.
146
Arguments that SGB V should be interpreted to cover alternative and
experimental treatments not yet evaluated under the section 135 procedures
are based in part on the structure of the Social Code. SGB V governs both
the relationships between insurers and their insureds and between insurers
and providers. It is argued that provisions like section 135 may limit pay-
ment of providers to particular procedures, but do not limit the independent
and higher right of insureds to receive other procedures where such proce-
dures are otherwise covered by SGB V.147 Even though providers may not
bill directly for services not covered by the EBM, it is argued, patients may
receive such services and then claim indemnification from their insurer.
148
In short, the commentators argue that the direct payment principle is sub-
ordinate to the comprehensiveness principle.
142. SCHmIDT-ROGNrrz, supra note 134, at 98-99, 107; Rolf-Ulrich Schlenker, Die
Auflenseitermedizin und das System der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung, 39 DIE
SOZIALGERICHTSBARKErr 530 (1992); Matthias von Wulffen, Besondere Therapiemetho-
den in der Rechtsprechung des Bundessozialgerichts, 43 DIE SozA LERicirSBARnxrT
250 (1996).
143. SCHMIDT-ROGNrrz, supra note 134, at 100-01.
144. Stephan Biehl and Heinz Ortwein, Sind Aufienseltermethoden Maflnahmen
auflerhalb des Leistungskataloges der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung (GKV)?, 38 DIE
SOCIALGERICHTBARKErr 529, 531-32 (1991).
145. BSG, 9/8/1993, 14aRKa 7/92, SozR 3-2500, § 2,No. 2.
146. LSG Niedersachsen 8/30/95, L 4 Kr 11/95, Breithaupt 191 (1996).
147. See SCHMIDT-ROGrrz, supra note 134, at 104-06; Schulin, supra note 136, at
558-59.
148. SCHmiDT-ROGhrrz, supra note 134, at 101.
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Further, some commentators have argued that the German Constitu-
tion would be violated if SGB V were interpreted to permit decisions of a
commission of doctors and insurers to establish rules that would limit the
rights of insureds.149 The delegation doctrine is much more robust in Ger-
many than in the United States, and the German Constitution limits the en-
tities to which authority for making generally binding rules can be dele-
gated and the forms such rules can take. It has been forcefully argued that
the commission that reviews experimental procedures is not an agency that
can constitutionally limit the rights of insureds.'
50
It is also more broadly argued that a total ban on coverage for services
not listed in the EBM would violate other constitutional rights. First, it
would arguably violate the constitutional right of doctors to professional
freedom.'' Second, it would violate the constitutional right of self deter-
mination and personal integrity of persons who are required by law to be
insured.152 Finally, it has been argued that the property and equal protec-
tion rights of persons required by law to be insured would be violated if
there were major gaps in their coverage, because supplemental commercial
insurance is neither affordable nor available to fill the gaps.153 A recent
decision of the German constitutional court, holding that the constitutional
right to self-determination, although applicable in the health insurance set-
ting, is subject to the statutory responsibility of the health insurers to limit
access to medication to promote efficiency, calls these arguments into
question.154 Nevertheless, they continue to be plausible.
In sum, the law has traditionally supported the claims of insureds to
alternative and experimental medicine, and the limitations found in SGB V
have been largely ineffective. Belief in alternative medicine is widespread
in Germany, and some believe that the costs of alternative medicine im-
pose a significant cost on the German health care system.
155
There may, however, be a trend toward greater restriction of coverage
of alternative and experimental treatment In recent years, the BSG has
149. Thomas Clemens, Verfassungsrechtliche Anforderungen an untergesetzliche
Rechtsnormen, 14 MEDIZnRECHT 432, 438-39 (1996).
150. Raimund Wimmer, erfassungsrechtliche Anforderungen an untergesetzliche
Rechtsetzung im Vertragsarztrecht, 14 MEDIZa4REcHT 425 (1996); cf Horst Dieter
Schirmer, erfassunsrechtliche Probleme der untergesetzlichen Normselzung im Kas-
senarztrecht, 14 MEDIZnmRECHT 404 (1996).
151. See Zuck, supra note 140, at 2933.
152. Art. 1 & 2 GG; see Zuck, supra note 140.
153. Schulin, supra note 137, at 562.
154. See BVerfG 3/5/97, 1 BvR 1068196, 15 MEDiznmcHT 318 (1997).
155. Rackfall ins Mittelalter, DER SPIEGEL, May 20, 1997, at 22; Schlenker, supra
note 142, at 530.
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become less receptive to alternative medicine, requiring at least a plausible
understanding of the method of operation of a particular medical interven-
tion.156 A 1995 decision of the First Senate went further, requiring statisti-
cal evidence of effectiveness. 157 The most important development, how-
ever, is a 1996 decision of the Sixth Senate, which holds that claims of
insureds are in fact limited by the section 135 coding rules.
15
The Sixth Senate of the BSG is responsible for reviewing the claims
of insurance doctors. As claims for coverage of alternative or experimen-
tal treatment have usually been brought by insureds, it has been generally
silent on these issues. In 1996, however, it considered a case involving a
doctor who had been refused permission to treat an addicted patient with
Methadon because the drug's treatment guidelines were not met in the par-
ticular case. The decision is long and carefully argued, and reaches the
conclusion that insureds are entitled only to receive insurance funds for
services for which providers are authorized to bill, and that this situation
does not violate the constitutional rights of insureds or providers or con-
stitutional limitations on delegation. 59  The decision has been sharply
criticized,160 but has been followed in another Sixth Senate decision, which
upheld the refusal of a KK to pay for extracorporeal shockwave lithotripsy
outside the hospital before it was approved for ambulatory coverage under
the new therapy guidelines.
161
It remains to be seen whether these decisions will extend beyond the
situations they addressed, where a federal commission representing both
providers and insurers (and thus derivatively insureds and employers) had
either already considered a particular treatment and issued guidelines re-
garding it or, alternatively, first issued guidelines regarding the therapy
after the service was rendered for which the claim was submitted. It also
remains to be seen whether other senates of the BSG will follow the deci-
sions of the Sixth Senate. The fundamental argument of the decision,
however, is compelling. The legislature is not capable of reviewing every
156. BSG, 2/9/89, 3 RK 19/87; BGG 2/10/93, 1 RK 17/91, noted in Wolfgang Wk,
Paramedizinsche Therapie undRechtsprechung, 13 MED1IznRECHT 492 (1995).
157. BSG, 7/5/95, 1 RK 6195, 14 MEDiza;REcHT 373 (1996), noted (n von Wulffen,
supra note 142, at 252.
158. BSG 3/20/96, 6 RKa 62/94, noted in 15 MEDiZiZR'CHT 123 (1997).
159. Id. at 129.
160. Raimund Wimmer, Substitution mit Methadon nach den NUB-Richilinien, 15
MEDIZrNRECHT 224 (1997). In another recent decision involving methadon, the First
Senate denied coverage because it was being used for a drug addiction maintenance pro-
gram, not for the treatment of a sickness. BSG, 3/12/96, 1 RK 33/94, Breithaupt 824
(1996).
161. BSG, 11/13/96, 6 RKa 31/95 (unpublished) (on file with author).
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treatment that could possibly be covered by the social insurance funds and
deciding on a case by case basis whether or not it should be covered. This
decision must either be delegated or left to the courts. It makes a great
deal of sense to delegate it to a commission that represents providers, in-
sureds, and those who pay for insurance. Judicial review must continue,
but only with respect to the reasonableness of decisions made by the ex-
perts best capable of deciding. Whether the German social courts will take
this approach, however, or whether they will continue to independently re-
view the coverage of experimental and alternative medicine is not yet
clear.
C. Efficiency Review Cases
In terms of sheer number of cases, probably the greatest involvement
of the social courts in health care financing is with respect to the process of
Wirtschaftlichkeitsprifung (WP), or economic monitoring, established by
section 106 SGB V. WP is essentially what we would think of as utiliza-
tion review. In contrast to the cases just considered, it does not address the
claims to particular types of coverage by individual patients, but rather the
aggregate provision or ordering of services for patients by particular doe-
tors. It is a process through which doctors and dentists who perform un-
necessary procedures or who order unnecessary drugs or therapy are first
warned and then, if they persist, have their payments reduced or are sub-
jected to fines. 162 Committees composed of representatives of the KKn
and the KaVn assess these penalties, which are subject to appeal to the so-
cial courts. 163 Decisions are frequently appealed and are frequently re-
versed by the social courts or settled after appeal. The WP process gener-
ates a great deal of work for lawyers, and a host of books have been written
describing the WP process.'6
The process of WP can only be understood in the context of the Ger-
man system of sector-specific medical care budgets. For two decades, first
162. § 106(5) SGB V. This discussion focuses primarily on the process as it is applied
to physicians. The process as it is applied to dentists is in most instances almost identi-
cal.
163. Id
164. ALEXANDER P.F. EHLERS, ET AL., PRAXS DER WIRTSCHAFUCHKEfTSPROFUNG
(1996) [hereinafter "EHLERS, FT AL."]; ALExANDER P.F. EHLERS, DiE
WIRTSCHAFLICHKEITSPROFUNG EM VERTRAGARZTRECHT (looseleaf; 1993); DimM
RADDATZ, DiE WIRT$CHAFrLICHKEIT DER KAsSENARZTuCHEN UND
KASSENZAHNARZTLICHEN VERSORGUNG IN DER REcHTsPREcH-u-G-WKR (1993);
WOLFGANG SPELLBRINK, WIRTSCHAFLICHKEITSPROFUNG IM KASSENARZTRECHT NACH DEM
GESUNDHEITS-STRUKTURGESETZ (1994); Thomas Clemens, Honorklarzung wegen Un-
witschaftlichkeit, in HANDBUCH SVR, supra note 51, at 910-60.
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voluntarily and then under the compulsion of law, the German sickness
funds and insurance doctors have negotiated annual budgets for physi-
cians' services. 65 In recent years, budgets have also been established for
prescribed drugs and therapies. 166 The regional KaVs pay their physicians
on a quarterly basis, with their payments depending on the number of
points they billed for services during the quarter based on the point values
assigned to services by the EBM.'67
The obvious incentive created by this system is for each doctor to bill
as many points as possibl to obtain the largest possible slice of the fixed
pie. Thus, a doctor's billings are reviewed by the KaV, to determine, first,
whether they are honest and accurate, and, second, whether they are for
services that are truly necessary. The honesty and accuracy of a doctor's
billings are reviewed through the sachlich-rechnerische Richtigstellung,
which reviews whether a service billed could in fact legally have been pro-
vided by the billing doctor considering his specialty and type of practice,
whether the service is correctly coded, and, at the margins, whether it was
in fact rendered. 168 The doctor's bills are also reviewed using a daily pro-
file program that assigns a plausible minimum number of minutes to each
of the services billed by physicians and reviews billing to determine
whether the number of services billed by the doctor could in :fact have been
provided in a reasonable working day.. 69 Doctors also have an obligation
not to serve so great a number of patients that they cannot reasonably care
for each patient, and doctors with unreasonably large practices may have
their payments reduced accordingly. 170 These reviews are performed by
the KaVn prior to the point when formal WP begins.
Doctors (and dentists) have an obligation under the SGB to provide
services sufficiently, effectively, and economically, and in no greater vol-
ume than necessary. 171 Section 106 SGB V, and the extensive body of
caselaw interpreting section 106 and earlier provisions of the Reichsversi-
cherungsordnug (RVO) which preceded it, provide a variety of methods
165. See supra text at notes 76 through 77, Schwartz & Busse, supra note 64.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05; Busse & Howorth, supra note 103.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 78 through 81.
168. See Thomas Clemens, Sachlich-rechnerische Richtigstellung, in HANDBUCH
SVR, supra note 51, at 899-909.
169. Id. at 904-07; see Hermann Mtlller, Allgemeinarzt war mit 25, 2 Stunden pro Tag
der Spitzenreiter beim Abkassieren, ARzm ZEItUG, Feb. 28, 1997, at 23 (reporting on
doctors who billed for obviously impossible numbers of points during the second quarter
of 1996).
170. Funk, supraoote 78, at 892-93.
171. §§2(4), 12 SGB V.
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that the KaVn and KKn may use to assure that services are economically
provided. The favored approach to economic monitoring for billing for
doctors' services is currently statistical review."12 The key variable in this
review is cost per patient, i.e., the average amount the doctor bills per pa-
tient.173 A doctor's billings are reviewed to determine how many points
the doctor has billed for each patient. For comparison purposes, doctors
are grouped by specialty and locality. 7 4 The group must be both suffi-
ciently homogenous and sufficiently large to permit meaningful statistical
comparison. 17 Doctors are also generally compared by patient group, spe-
cifically considering separately older, retired patients and younger pa-
tients.176 Doctors with extraordinarily high billings are subject to sanc-
tions.
The statistical comparison usually encompasses a doctors' total bill-
ing, but it can be limited to particular services or categories of services.
t
Two different statistical approaches have been taken for comparison.
Originally the comparison focused on percentage deviation from the aver-
age. Under this approach, doctors whose total billings exceed the average
of their comparison group by fifty percent are considered to be obvious
outliers, subject to sanctions unless they can explain the deviation.' 7 '
Doctors whose billings lie in the twenty to fifty percent range are subject
to scrutiny for uneconomic conduct. 7 9 Physicians whose billings lie less
than twenty percent above the mean are considered to be within the range
of random variation, and are not subject to further examination.I ° Where
the review focuses on individual services or groups of services, rather than
on total billings, a wider range of deviation is permitted, recognizing that
ranges of variance will be broader with respect to individual services than
for an entire practice.'
8 '
In recent years, the percentage deviation approach has been called
into question. Some have argued that a more accurate approach is to con-
sider distribution around the mean, i.e., location on the so-called Gausian
172. BSG, 11115/95, 6 RKa 43/94, SozR 3-2500, § 106, No. 33.
173. SPELLBRnK, supra note 164, at 195-212.
174. Id at212-15.
175. d at215-16.
176. RADDATZ, supra note 164, at 254-55.
177. SPox RnqK, supra note 164, at 198-203.
178. Id at 239.
179. Iad
180. Id
181. BSG, 4/8/92, 6 RKa34/90, SozR3-2500, § 106, Nr. 11.
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curve. 18 2 This approach recognizes that in very homogenous groups, a
doctors' billings could be exceptional even though they lie only a small
percentage above the norm, while in less homogenous groups a much
larger percentage deviation could be unexceptional. Under this approach
the determining factor is the number of standard deviations from the norm,
with physicians whose billings lie over 1.6 standard deviations above the
norm considered obvious outliers.18 3 Neither the statute nor the decisions
of the BSG endorse either approach. In a series of recent decisions, how-
ever, the BSG has criticized lower courts that have strictly relied on the
Gausian distribution approach without further evidentiary evaluation.,
84
A doctor who is found to be a statistical outlier has two primary lines
of defense. First, and most importantly, the doctor may argue that there are
exceptional circumstances respecting his or her practice that justify the de-
viation.185 The possibilities here are rather limited because (1) some ex-
ceptional circumstances are accounted for in the original comparison proc-
ess (high proportion of elderly patients, for example, is not an excuse since
elderly patients are compared separately); (2) others are accounted for by
the permitted deviation from the mean (exceptionally sick patients); and
(3) still others are not acceptable excuses as they are precisely the problem
at which WP is aimed (particularly frequent use of expensive equipment).
Some exceptional circumstances, however, are regularly recognized, such
as the fact that a doctor is just beginning a practice and must perform'an
exceptional number of initial interviews and examinations, or that the
doctor practices in a particular subspecialty or with a particular method
that results in the treatment of more expensive patients.'86 Doctors such as
pathologists who perform services primarily on a referral basis may also
argue that they were simply performing services requested by other doc-
tors.1
87
Second, doctors subject to sanctions for deviation from the norm with
respect to particular services or groups of services may claim that the high
182. See WiLHELM GAuS, PROFUNG DER WIRTSCHAFTLICHKEIT DER BEHANDLUNGS-UND
VERORDNUNGSWEISE DES KAssENARzTEs (1988).
183. Clemens, supra note 164, at 935.
184. BSG, 3/15/95, 6 RKa 37/93, reported at 49 NEUE JumusnsCH WocfENscHRiFT
2448 (1996); Wolfgang Noftz, Wirischaflichkeitsprafung im Vertrags(zahn)arztrecht
zwischen Statistik und Intellektualiitat?-Aktuelle Tendenzen der neueren Rechtspre-
chung, NEuE ZEITSCHRiFT SoZiALRECHT 207 (1997).
185. RADDATZ, supra note 164, at 374-444; SPELLBRINK, supra note 164, at 137, para.
274.
186. Clemens, supra note 164, at 937-38; SPELLBRINK, supra note 164, at 278-80.
187. SPELLBRINK, supra note 164, at 286-87.
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use of certain services is compensated for by low usage in other areas.188
Doctors may argue, for example, that they gave a high number of injec-
tions because they prescribed fewer oral medications.19
The individual cases of doctors may also be subjected to review on a
case by case basis. For a long time, the BSG held up individual case re-
view as the preferred form of economic review,19° but it quickly became
obvious that it was generally not practical. The BSG decided quite early
that for an individual review to be truly accurate and reliable, it would
have to go beyond the doctor's records, perhaps including an actual exami-
nation of the individual patient to determine the patient's actual condi-
tion.191 Moreover, the examination would have to focus not on the pa-
tient's condition at the time of the review, but on the patient's condition at
the time of the treatment. Individual review is difficult because the WP
commissions do not have the resources to perform such examinations, and
have no means to require patients to submit to them. 19 Individual review
based on the doctor's records is permitted but is regarded skeptically by
the courts. Extrapolations based on individual reviews are also permitted,
allowing sanctions to exceed the levels warranted by the individual cases
reviewed but only once a relatively large group of cases have been re-
viewed.193 Only in the dental area, where review can readily be 9Verformed
on the basis of x-rays, does individual review play a major role.,
188. RADDATZ, supra note 164, at 330-73.
189. Clemens, supra note 164, at 941-42.
190. RADDATZ, supra note 164, at 146.
191. See BSG, 6/2/87, 6 RKa 19/86, SozR 2200, § 368n, No. 54; Hans-Siegmund
Danckwerts, Kassenzahndrztliche Versorgung: Oberwachung der Mirtschafllchkeit
durch Einzelfallprafungen, 70 DIE ORTSKRANKENKKAsSE 458 (1988).
192. SPELLBRI,, supra note 164, at 315-16.
193. At least 100 cases or 20% of the total, with a discount from the extrapolated re-
sult of 25% to account for uncertainty. SPELLBRINK, supra note 164, at 320-21.
194. SPFLLRuK, supra note 164, at 315. The 1989 health reform law introduced a
new form of economic monitoring based on sampling. § 106(2)2 SGB V. The idea
grounding this random review is that doctors who avoid being obvious outliers often also
have uneconomical practices, and should be subject to review. Under the sampling re-
view, two percent of non-outlier physicians are supposed to be randomly selected each
quarter for review. § 106(2) SGB V; see Ursula Spiolek, Das Wirtschafilchkeitsgebot
des SGB V und die beiden neuen Formen der Wirtschaflichkeitsprlfung-Stchproben-
und Richtgr6fienpraifung-nach § 106 111 SGB V, 38 ZE 5c1RrFT FOR SozLp oRm
209 (1992). Statistical review is not appropriate as a method for sampling review, both
because sampling review is by definition a statutory alternative to statistical review, and
because sampling is used precisely because the doctors it affects are not statistical out-
liers. Comprehensive case by case review of individual patients, on the other hand for
two percent of all doctors would quickly exhaust the resources of the economic review
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Not only are services provided by doctors subject to economic moni-
toring, but prescriptions, bandages, and therapy are also reviewed. 95
These reviews are normally carried out, again, through a statistical review
of prescriptions. 196 They result in sanctions much less frequently than
billing reviews, 197 but are of more interest to the KKn as they result in ac-
tual recoveries by the KK, not simply in reallocation of funds among doc-
tors. Under the 1992 reform law, reviews are also supposed to be per-
formed based on deviations from prescribing volume guidelines to be
agreed to by the KaVn and KKn.19  Between 1994 and 1997, however,
implementation of these guidelines would have resulted under the terms of
the law in termination of the prescribing budgets imposed by the 1992 law,
and was resisted by the KKn who preferred to preserve fixed budgets.
Economic review committees consisting of an equal number of mem-
bers from the KKn and the KaVn initially perform economic review.1 99 A
doctor who is sanctioned may have a hearing before an appeal committee,
the Beschwerdeausschufi, which also contains members d'awn equally200
from the KKn and KaVn. If the sanction stands, the doctor may go to
court.
2 0 1
On the whole, doctors face fairly substantial incentives to appeal WP
decisions. Access to the social court is free,20 2 and a doctor whose com-
commissions. SPELLBRiNK, supra note 164, at 325. Sampling review, therefore, has to
date played virtually no role in EHLERS, Er AL., supra note 164, at 92.
195. § 106(2)1 SGB V.
196. SPELLBRINK, supra note 164, at 333.
197. Statistics regarding the use of WP nationwide are not available generally in Ger-
many. The author wrote to all KVn in Germany, therefore, requesting information re-
garding WP statistics. A number of KVn responded, but most did not have the requested
data available. A fee of the KVn provided data with response to the relative frequency of
sanctions involving fee claims compared to those involving prescribing. In 1994, one
KV had 36 prescribing WP cases, 123 fee WP cases; a second had 19 prescribing and 76
fee cases; a third in 1995 had 61 drug prescribing and 325 fee cases.
198. §§ 84, 106(2)1 SGB V.
199. § 106(4) SGB V.
200. § 106(5) SGB V.
201. Id. In the responses returned to the author's questionnaire, noted supra note 196,
one KV stated that in 1995 during the first quarter of 1995 it sanctioned 213 doctors for
excessive fees, 138 of which appealed internally, and 21 of whom ended up appealing to
the social court. A second KV sanctioned 361 doctors during the first quarter of 1995, of
whom 108 appealed internally and eight appealed to the social court. A third KV had
127 internal appeals in 1995, followed to date by six social court appeals. Finally, a
fourth small KV had nine to eleven sanctions per quarter during 1995, of which two to
four were appealed internally in each quarter, and one case was filed in the social court
in each of three quarters.
202. § 183 SGG (Sozialgerichtsgesetz).
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plaint is successful is entitled to have costs incurred in the appeal, includ-
ing the costs of a necessary attorney, reimbursed.0 3 Although since 1993
the doctor who loses a WP proceeding is obligated to reimburse a WP
panel for necessary attorney costs it has incurred, panels do not usually
retain attorneys unless a case goes to court, and they are not entitled to
reimbursement for their administrative costs or the costs of internal legal
staff204 On the other hand, an appeal to court does not generally stay the
imposition of the sanction,05 and therefore if a considerable sum of money
is involved, a doctor may be better served by a settlement than by an ap-
peal, which could last several years. Thus, doctors appeal WP decisions
relatively often, but then settle the case on appeal.
In reading WP cases, one cannot help but be struck with the intensity
of judicial supervision of the process. Section 106 of SGB V, which gov-
erns WP, is relatively short. Yet the BSG has developed an extensive body
of caselaw governing in minute detail the methods that are available for
WP, in what order they must be applied, the statistical methods that must
be employed, the defenses doctors may raise, and the procedures through
which the whole process is applied. As noted above, early decisions of the
BSG imposed such rigorous demands on individual case review as to make
this form of review, perhaps the most common form of utilization review
in the United States, not viable. More recent decisions involving statistical
review involve highly technical mathematical questions, difficult for the
layman to understand.2 6 This body of judge-made law applies nationwide,
and cannot be varied by agreement by the regional KKn and KaVn.20 7
In the end, doctors have rights-rights enshrined in the Constitution,
though these cases rarely advert to the Constitution. Article 12, section 1
of the Constitution protects the freedom of professionals to practice their
profession, while Article 19, section 4 guarantees access to the court by
those whose rights are violated by public institutions. Individual doctors
must be treated fairly-the level of arbitrariness common in American
utilization review decisions would not be tolerated in Germany.7° This
does not mean that doctors always bring or win WP appeals. Appeals are
203. EHLERS, ET AL., supra note 164, at 118-20.
204. Id. at 120-21.
205. l at 135-42.
206. See, e.g., BSG, 8/5/92, 14aI6 RKa 4/90, SozR 3-2500, § 106, Nr. 13.
207. See BSG, 11/30/94, 6 RKa 16/93, SozR3-2500, § 106, Nr. 25.
208. See Donald Light, Life, Death, and the Insurance Companies, 330 N. ENG. J.
MED. 498 (1994); William P. Peters & Mark C. Rogers, Variation in Approval by Insur-
ance Companies of Coverage for Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation for Breast
Cancer, 330 N. ENG. J. MED. 473 (1994).
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often brought by the KaVn or KKn, and they often win. The more recent
cases have emphasized the expertise and discretion of the WP panels, and
have loosened the grip that some of the social courts were imposing on
their decisions.20 9 But one has the impression that the many demands and
requirements imposed on WP by the courts have made it difficult both for
doctors to know what to expect from the process and for the panels to
know how to apply it. In the end, more and more cases are settled either
before the Beschwerdeausschufl or at the first level of judicial review,
probably leaving both the doctors and the payors feeling that the best result
was denied.
Economic review has not been very successful in limiting unnecessary
services or prescribing. First, it effects only a relatively small number of
doctors, and an even smaller proportion of expenditures.210 Because sanc-
tions are generally limited to statistical outliers, the system has no effect on
unnecessary services so long as most doctors provide them.21' If it is true,
as is generally believed, that doctors use practice computers to protect
themselves from becoming outliers, the effect of sanctions on controlling
the use of unnecessary procedures or prescribing is even less significant.
Even when doctors are sanctioned, the sanctions are quite mild. If the
doctor is a first time offender, the most likely sanction is a warning.
213
When financial sanctions are imposed, the doctor's payments are usually
only reduced to the level of obvious outlier status, 214 and thus the doctor
remains well-paid. Doctors can lose their permission to practice as insur-
ance doctors for repeated offenses, but this rarely occurs.2
As long as the tight physicians services and prescribing budgets of the
1992 reform law were in place, the KKn had fairly minimal interest in the
WP process, which mainly involved reallocation of restricted budgets
among providers. The significant increase in service billing that accompa-
209. See supra text accompanying note 184; Wolfgang Spellbrink, Die "Intelleklueiie
Wirtschaftlichkeitsprfifung, " 3 MEDIZINRECHT 125 (1996).
210. In response to the author's questionnaire, supra at note 196, one large KV re-
ported reviewing between 5.61% and 6.3 1% of its doctors in each quarter in 1995, but in
each quarter cut only between .53% and .6% of total payments to doctors through WP.
Another KV reported reviewing between 2.1% and 3.9% of its doctors during four quar-
ters in 1993 and 1994. A third reviewed between 9.81% and 12.16% of its doctors dur-
ing the four quarter of 1995.
211. SPELLBRINK, supra note 164, at 306-08.
212. RADDATZ, supra note 164, at 167; but see SPELLBRINK, supra note 164, at 308-
13.
213. § 106(5) SGB V.
214. See SPELLBRINK, supra note 164, at 302.
215. §§ 81(5), 95(6) SGB V; EHLERS, ETAL., supra note 164, at 255-63.
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nied the fall of the point value during 1996 unleashed a flood of WP sanc-
tions. Under the second Neuordnungsgesetz (NOG2), which took effect on
June 12, 1997, fixed global budgets for both provider services and drugs
were abolished, though more flexible budgeting will continue.2 16 Praxis
Budgets instituted for provider service billing effective July 1, 1997, basi-
cally capitate most services on an individual patient basis, diminishing the
importance of WP, but the KaVn have committed themselves to abolishing
Praxis Budgets, probably returning to a fee-for-service system.217 Doctors
have also fought hard for a fixed-point value based system, which is recog-
nized to a degree by the NOG.21 The NOG2 also requires prescribing vol-
ume guidelines to be put into place, and abolish the prior fixed budgets? 19
These prescribing guidelines are supposed to be specialty-specific. Doc-
tors whose prescribing varies more than fifteen percent above the guide-
lines are supposed to be subjected to review automatically; those whose
prescribing lies twenty-five percent above the average must pay the KKn
for the difference, unless they can justify their prescribing based on excep-
tional circumstances peculiar to their practice.? ° This provision is likely
to result in a flood. of economic monitoring proceedings.
Fixed point value billing would make a vigorous WP system abso-
lutely essential to the KKn. The institution of drug prescribing guidelines
will also require tight WP oversight. It is likely that the importance of WP
will greatly increase in the not too distant future. The question remains,
therefore, whether the courts will permit the development of an effective
WP process or whether they will interpret the statute narrowly and techni-
cally, making utilization review difficult.
D. Review of the Decisions of Arbitration Panels
To this point we have been discussing the role of the courts, espe-
cially the social courts, in resolving disputes regarding the allocation of re-
sources in the German health care system. The primary means of resolving
resource allocation disputes in the German health care system, however, is
negotiation. In Germany, resource allocation policy over a wide range of
issues, and in particular budgets that determine resource allocation to par-
ticular health care sectors, are determined through negotiations involving
216. 2 GKV-NOG, supra note 141 at § 20, to be codified at § 85(2) SGB V and § 27
to be codified at § 84 SGB V.
217. Josef Maus, Praxisbudgets: Nur noch ein Modell far den Obergang, 93
DEUTSCHES ARz nLArr A-1536 (1997).
218. 2 GKV-NOG, supra note 140, § 28 (amending § 85(2) SGB V).
219. Id at § 27 (amending § 84 SGB V).
220. § 106(5a) SGB V.
1998]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
the KKn on one side and provider organizations on the other.221 Payments
for hospitals, for example, are determined through negotiations between
the representatives of the insurance funds and of the hospitals.222 Budgets
for payment of physicians have been negotiated between the KaVn and the
state KKn associations. 23 In the past, drug budgets have been negotiated
between the KaVn and the associations of krankenkassen (or ersatzkas-
sen); in the future these same institutions will negotiate prescribing guide-
lines.224 A wide range of issues other than budgets are also scttled through
institutional negotiations.2
5
If disputes must be settled through negotiations, however, there is al-
ways the problem of what to do when negotiations break dom-when the
parties can not or do not reach an agreement. The mechanism provided
generally in German health insurance law is the Schiedsstelle.226 Schied-
sstelle are essentially arbitration panels. They exist at both the national
and Land level in Germany, and address a wide variety of issues and
problems both within and outside of the health insurance sector.227 They
impose a solution to disputes when the parties who are supposed to negoti-
ate a solution are unable to do so. During 1996, for example, ten of the
seventeen negotiations to establish the conversion value for the case and
procedure payments for hospitals, discussed above, ended up before
Schiedsstelle.
228
Schiedsstelle generally have two types of members, partisan and non-
partisan. Each side of the contract dispute has an equal number of partisan
members, who represent the interests of their institutions. The number of
partisan members is usually determined by the number of sorts of insur-
221. See Marian Dohler & Philip Manow-Borgwardt, Korporatisierung als gesund-
heitspolitische Strategie, 3 STAATSWiSSENSCHAFrEN UND STAATSPRAXiS 64 (1992).
222. § 18 KHG (Krankenhausfinanzierungsgesetz).
223. §§ 82, 83, 85 SGB V.
224. § 84 SGB V.
225. See, e.g., § 87 SGB V, describing the contents of the national structural contract
that is to be negotiated between the KaVn and the KK national association to establish
the framework of health insurance medical practice.
226. See, e.g., §§ 89, 114 SGB V; § 18 KHG; see generally Ruth Daring, Das Schied-
swesen in der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung, 21 ARBEITS-UND SOcZiALREcHT (1992);
WOLFGANG GrrrER AND MEmiARD HEINzE, Dm SCHIEDSSTELLE DES
KRANKENHAusFINANZIERUNGSGESETZS (1989).
227. See, e.g., Timothy Jost, Schlichtungsstellen and Gutachterkommissionen: The
German Approach to Extrajudicial Malpractice Claims Resolution, 11 J. ON DISPUTE
RES. 81 (1996) (describing the use of Schiedsstelle in medical malpractice cases).
228. TuscHEN & QUAAS, supra note 82, at 84-85. All of the Schiedsstelle decisions in
these cases were appealed to the administrative courts.
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ance funds affected by the negotiations, with an equal number of repre-
sentatives of the provider or provider organizations. Schiedsstelle gener-
ally have three "non-partisan" members, including_?a chair, who are sup-
posed to be appointed by both sides by agreement. Neither the partisan
nor the non-partisan members are bound by the instructions of those who
appoint them-all are technically free agents.230 If the parties cannot agree
on an impartial chair, one is chosen by lot from the nominees of both
sides.3 1 As a practical matter, each side usually picks one sympathetic
"impartial" member, and the chair-usually an eminent professor or retired
judge-is the only member who is truly impartial.
Schiedsstelle proceedings are initiated when the parties reach an im-
passe in negotiations, or, with respect to hospital budget negotiations
when six weeks pass without negotiations resulting in agreement?3
Schiedsstellen must act quickly-Shiedsstelle dealing with contracts be-
tween the KKn and doctors must resolve the issues before them and issue a
final order within three months. 33 Shiedsstelle proceedings are not open to
the public, although the parties may be present while evidence is taken.234
Only the members of the Schiedsstelle are present for its deliberations, al-
though the members may consult their constituents. s The Schiedsstelle
conducts an oral hearing, hearing witnesses and experts and assembling
evidence.36 The parties have an obligation to work together with the
Schiedsstelle and to expedite the proceedings.3 7 Decisions are reached by
majority vote, with each party having one vote. 3
The chair plays a major role in the proceedings, clarifying the issues
in a written opening summary, ensuring that the parties submit appropriate
documents, overseeing the proceedings, and writing the decision of the
panel, with appropriate justification? - The Schiedsstelle have jurisdiction
only to decide issues to the extent that the parties cannot themselves reach
229. §§ 89(3), 114(2) SGB V. Under § 18 of the KHG, there is only one neutral
party, the chair, who is appointed by agreement of the parties, or, failing that, by the
Land.
230. § 18(3) KHG; § 114(3) SGB V.
231. §§ 89(3), 114(2) SGB V.
232. § 18(4) KHG.
233. § 89(1) SGB V.
234. Daring, supra note 226, at 108-09.
235. ML at 111.
236. d at 107-08, 109-10; Meinhard Heinze, erfahren und Entscheldung der
Schiedsstelle, in GrrrER & HEiNZE, supra note 226, at 61, 66-67.
237. Id at 65-67.
238. § 114(3) SGB V; § 18a(3) KHG.
239. Gr= & HEwmZF, supra note 226, at 70-84.
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agreement, and the chair and other nonpartisan members often propose
settlements for the parties to consider themselves before proceeding to im-
pose a settlement.40 In the final vote, the partisan and party-affiliated
nonpartisan members quite often take the position of their constituents,
leaving the chair the deciding vote.
The decision of the Schiedsstelle must comply with governing law.
Setting of budgets for doctors' compensation, for example, must observe
the principle of premium stability, but must also assure adequate compen-
sation.241 The Schiedsstelle's decisions that set hospital budgets must first
be aSproved by the state administration before they become legally bind-
ing. In the end, decisions of the Schiedsstelle can be appealed to court:
hospital budget decisions are appealed to the administrative courts because
they affect the Lander; other health insurance decisions are appealed to the
social courts. The Schiedsstelle have considerable discretion in reaching
their decisions, however, and the bodies that review their decisions can
only reject them if they violate the law.243 Schiedsstelle decisions are ap-
pealed fairly often, but are usually affirmed at the trial court level and
rarely appealed to higher courts.
The Schiedsstelle play a vital role in resolving disputes in the German
health insurance system, and, ultimately in resource allocation questions.
Their existence assures that negotiations will reach a conclusion. If one
party fails to cooperate in the negotiation process, the dispute will go to the
Schiedsstelle which will resolve it. Thus, parties are always under pressure
to negotiate disputes when negotiation is possible. On the other hand, as
budgets have become tighter in recent years, an ever increasing number of
cases are ending up in the Schiedsstelle process.244 The legitimacy of the
process depends to a certain extent on it being a last resort. If Schiedsstelle
resolution of disputes becomes the norm, and if disputes are consistently
sufficiently divisive that most are resolved by the chair, the whole institu-
240. Interviews between the author and Gtlnter Spielmeyer, head of the Bundesschied-
samt, June 9, 1997, and Professor Wolfgang Gitter, May 22, 1997.
241. Andreas Hustadt, Blockieren oder Gestalten? Zur Entscheidungspraxis und Rolle
der Schiedsampter, 77 DiE ERSATZKASSE 117, 118 (1997)
242. Gunter Kisker, Verwaltungsrechtdogmatik zwischen Vereinbarungsprinzip und
direktionsprinzip-Zur Rechtsnatur der Schiedsstelle und zur Kontrolle ihrer
Entscheidungen durch Genehmigungsbeharde und Gericht, in GiTrER & HEINZE , supra
note 226, at 21; Dieter Krauskopf, Das Genehmingungsverfahren durch die Verwal-
tungsbehorde, in GrrTER & HEINzE, supra note 226, at 39.
243. BVerwG 6/22/95, 3 C 34-93; BVerG 1/21/93, 3 C 66.90; see Kisker, supra note
242, at 30-33.
244. A recent article reports that in 17 of 22 KzV regions, Schiedsverfalren were nec-
essary to establish dental budgets in 1996. Hustadt, supra note 241, at 11:3.
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tion may be called into question. One way in which Schiedsstelle can re-
tain legitimacy is to limit their efforts to preservation of the status quo, to
avoid innovation that would provoke controversy. The Schiedsstelle have
indeed been criticized for their lack of creativity and for their dedication to
status quo preservation.24s Nonetheless, their contribution to maintaining a
system of resource allocation based on corporate negotiation and for re-
ducing dependence on litigation must not be overlooked.
E. Conclusion
In summary, the German courts take a very activist role in overseeing
the German statutory health insurance system. On the whole, they have
tended to expand coverage, as with Hilfsmittel and alternative and experi-
mental treatment, and to protect the rights of individual insureds and pro-
viders, as is evidenced in judicial review of Wirtschaftlichekeitsprnfiing
decisions. When discretion is clearly and properly delegated to another
decisionmaking body, as with the Schiedsstelle, or perhaps with the com-
mission of doctors and insurers responsible for updating the EBM to ac-
count for new technology, the courts defer to the decisions of such bodies.
VI. The British National Health Service: Allocating by
Administrative Discretion
The British National Health Service offers a striking contrast to the
German systems of health care finance--in the simplicity of its organiza-
tion, in its economy, and in its freedom from judicial oversight. The NHS
has for five decades provided tax-financed health care in Great Britain. It
is centrally organized, headed by the NHS Executive, a Branch of the De-
partment of Health, which operates within the framework established by
the Department of Health and the Policy Board.2 46 Both of the latter are
headed by the Secretary of State for Health, who in turn answers to Par-
liament.247 Operationally, the NHS is administered through District Health
Authorities located throughout Britain, which purchase health care with
funds allocated to them by the NHSE.2 48 The DHAs contract with local
NIIS Trust hospitals and with private providers to purchase secondary and
tertiary health care services for their constituents, and in a very few in-
245. Id at 119-20.
246. LONGLEY, supra note 37, at 110-13.
247. Id
248. RuTH LEvITT, ANDREW WALL, & JOHN APPLEBY, THE REORGANIED NAToNAL
HEALTH SERvicE, 68-73 (1995).
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stances manage their own provider units directly.249 The DHAs have re-
cently been merged with the Family Health Service Authorities (FHSAs),
which contract with independent general practitioners (GPs) to provide
primary care, either independently or as fund-holding general practices.
250
The NHS is slated for further reorganization under a plan recently put forth
by the new Labor government, but will retain a separation between pur-
chasers and providers, with purchasing power moving toward new, larger,
groups of primary care providers.25'
Resource allocation decisions are made at every level of the NHS, be-
ginning with the initial government budgetary decision as to how much to
allocate to the NHS as compared to other government departments, fol-
lowed by allocations among the districts by means of a weighted capitation
formula, then by distribution of funds among providers according to Dis-
trict priorities and purchasing arrangements, and finally rationing of re-
sources among patients by hospital management, "consultants" or hospital
doctors, and general practitioners.
252
The NHS operates arguably one of the most efficient health care sys-
tems in the world. In 1995 Britain spent 6.9% of its GDP on health care,
5.9% in NHS spending, and 1% in private.253 This is about one half the
percentage of GDP that the United States spent on health care in the same
year.254 In terms of real spending, the difference is even more dramatic: in
1995 Britain spent $1300 per person, Germany $2840 per person, and the255
United States $3830 per person. Every resident in the United Kingdom,
however, has access to NIS care, which though it does not always meet
public expectations or the standards found in countries that spend more, is
on the whole adequate and in some sectors quite good. Health care in the
United Kingdom must explicitly compete head to head with other public
services for resources in the budget process. The NIS budget represents
in a very real sense a choice taken by elected representatives of the public
as to what share of the nation's resources should be dedicated to health
care. By contrast, health care in the United States is paid for by a host of
private and public sources (including hidden public subsidies such as tax
249. Id.; see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, et al., The British Health Care Reforms, the
American Health Care Revolution, and Purchaser/Provider Contracts, 20 J.HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 885 (1995) (examining the contracting process and contracts).
250. LONGLEY, supra note 37, at 124, 128-29.
251. See NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE, NHS WHITE PAPER, THE NEW NHS (1997).
252. RUDOLF KLEIN, ET AL., MANAGING ScARcrry 45-48, 55-60 (1996).
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exclusions and deductions), making effective control over health care ex-
penditures far more difficult.
The existence of and need for rationing is openly acknowledged and
discussed in Britain, and much of rationing theory and technology stems
from Britain.2s6 One small indication of the rationality of the NHS is a re-
cent study that found that ten of the fifty most often sold pharmaceutical
products in Italy and France and six of the fifty most often sold products in
Germany had no clear evidence of therapeutical effectiveness; none of the
fifty most prescribed drugs in Britain fell in this category.2
7
Rationing is carried out in the United Kingdom through a host of ex-
plicit and implicit methods. Among the best known British tools for ra-
tioning are waiting lists (delay) and standards of practice that deny many
persons, particularly elderly persons, services that would be available in
other nations. Waiting lists for certain surgical services have existed in the
United Kingdom since the foundation of the NHS, and are often seen sim-
plistically by economists as evidence that excess demand is inevitable
when supply is artificially constrained. A recent reexamination of the
waiting list phenomena reveals a much more complex explanation, in
which waiting lists result on the one hand from the fact that the patients on
waiting lists (mostly elderly) and the conditions from which they suffer
(hernias and hemorrhoids, for example) tend to be unattractive and unin-
teresting to hospital doctors, and on the other from the fact that physicians
are often rewarded for maintaining long waiting lists by opportunities for
private practice and by access to new resources. 8  Waiting lists are,
nonetheless, an important tool for allocating scarce resources within the
NHS.
Denial of some services, often by simple failure to mention their po-
tential availability or usefulness, was first documented by Aaron and
Schwartz in their 1984 comparison of medical practice in the United King-
256. See, e.g., FRANKEL & WEsT, supra note 30; KEEN, ET AL., supra note 252;
RATIONING HEALTH CARE (R.J. Maxwell, ed., 1995); BILL NEw & JULIAN LE GRAm,
RATIONING INTHENHS: PRINcIPLEs AND PRAGMATISM (1996) (recent British publications
discussing rationing). The classic American book which initiated discussion of rationing
in the United States was a study of the NHS. HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. ScHWARTZ,
THE PA-FUL PRESCRITON: RATIONING HosPrrAL CARE (1984). The quality-adjusted life
year (QUALY) approach to valuation of health care interventions was developed in
England, and is now being considered throughout the world. See, e.g., Arti Kaur Rai,
Rationing Through Choice: A New Approach to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health
Care, 72 IND. L.J 1015 (1997).
257. S. Garattini & L. Garattini, Pharmaceutical prescriptions in four European
Countries, 342 THE LANCET 1191 (1993).
258. FRANL& WEST, supra note 30, at 1-14.
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dom and the United States.259 Particularly well-documented is the denial
of renal dialysis to the elderly, but many coronary care units also limit ad-
mission on the basis of age.
260
Under the internal market reforms introduced by the Conservative
government in the early 1990s, rationing became more explicit. Alloca-
tions are being made under these reforms (still largely in place under the
new Labor government) in the first instance by the district health authori-
ties and reflected in their purchasing plans. Purchasing plans of the Dis-
trict Health Authorities increasingly explicitly exclude certain procedures,
though they tend to be marginal procedures which are not major expendi-
ture concerns, like tattoo removal and reversal of sterilization.261 Extra-
contractual referrals, referrals of patients to providers who do not have a
contract with a DHA, must be approved by a DHA.262 Though DHAs may
not refuse ECRs in emergencies, the fact that they must be approved makes
rationing again more explicit. Recent government proposals would do
away with ECRs, but also affirm a commitment to planned purchasing.
263
When services are denied British patients, the patients occasionally go
to court. The response they meet in the courts, however, is very different
from that encountered by German patients seeking judicial relief. Cases
directly challenging resource allocation decisions in the NUS have almost
always been unsuccessful.2  The National Health Services Act of 197
recognizes a principle of comprehensiveness much like that governing the
German health insurance system. The Act imposes on the Secretary of
State a:
... duty to continue the promotion in England and Wales of a com-
prehensive health service designed to secure improvement (a) in the
physical and mental health of the people in those countries, and (b) in
the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness, and for that purpose
to provide and secure the effective provision of services in accordance
with this Act.
265
259. AARON & SCHWARTZ, supra note 256.
260. KLEIN, ET AL., supra note 252, at 87-88.
261. Id. at 68-73, 140-42.
262. LONGLEY, supra note 37, at 139-40.
263. See THE NEw NHS, supra note 251.
264. See DIANE LONGLEY, PUBLIC LAW AND HEALTH SERvICE ACCOUINrABILITY 79-82
(1993); CHRISTOPHER NEWDICK, WHO SHOULD WE TREAT? 119-35 (1995) [hereinafter
"Newdick, Treat"]; Christopher Newdick, Resource Allocation in the National Health
Service, 22 AM.J.L.& MED. 291 (1997) [hereinafter "Newdick, Resource Allocation].
265. National Health Services Act, § 1 (1977) (Eng.) [hereinafter "NHSA"].
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The Statutes further provides at section 3(1) that "[ilt is the Secretary
of State's duty to provide ... to such extent as he considers necessary to
meet all reasonable requirements . .," and then proceeds to list specific
medical services, such as hospital accommodation, medical, dental, and
nursing care, and other health services.
Although on its face the statute appears to impose upon the Secretary
of State an obligation to provide medical services, the courts have gener-
ally rejected attempts to enforce the statute judicially. The first case to
consider the question was R v. Secretary of State for Social Services, ex
parte Hincks, which challenged the failure of the Health Services to con-
struct a new orthopaedic unit in Birmingham, which had been approved by
the Secretary of State in 1971 but postponed, and then abandoned in 1978.
The plaintiffs alleged that the Secretary of State had failed in his duty to
provide a comprehensive health service by not constructing the unit as ap-
proved. The Court of Appeals, by Lord Denning, affirmed at trial court
judgment denying relief, noting that the courts could not direct the Secre-
tary of State's decisions as to how to allocate resources among competing
claimants.
267
Subsequent cases have denied relief in cases in which: (1) a premature
baby was denied an operation to repair his heart;2 68 (2) a four year old boy,
who needed an operation to repair his heart had had a desperately needed
surgery scheduled and canceled three times; 2 69 and (3) a woman was de-
nied in vitro fertilization because she was over thirty-five years of age.
The courts invariably in these cases review the decision of the health
authority under a gross abuse of discretion standard,27' and on this basis
uphold the health authority's decision.
In the recent case of R v. Cambridge Health Authority ex parte B, the
lower court broke with previous deferential precedents, indicating its
willingness to review the decision of a health authority. The health
authority had denied B, a ten year old girl with leukemia, a bone-marrow
266. 1 BMLR 93 (1992) (decided in 1980).
267. IdM at 95-96.
268. R. v. Secretary of State, ex parte Walker, 3 BMLR 32 (1992) (decided 1987).
269. R. v. Central Birmingham Health Authority, cx parte Collier (unreported 1988),
reprinted in part in IAN KENNEDY AND ANDREW GRUBB, MEDICAL LAw-TEXT AND
MATERLALs 428 (1994)).
270. R. v. Scheffield Health Authority, ex parte Seale, 25 BMLR 1 (1994).
271. Under English law this is referred to as the Wednesbury standard of review.
Professor Newdick describes a Wednesbury unreasonable decision as one "so unreason-
able that no reasonable person addressing himself to the issue in question could have
come to such a decision." Newdick, Resource Allocation, supra note 264, at 297.
1998]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
transplant (her second), which would have cost £75,000. Judge Laws,
writing for the lower court, rejected the claim of the health authority that it
did not have the resources to fund the needed care, and remanded the case
to the health authority to reconsider and explain its decision.272 The case
was appealed, however, to the Court of Appeals, which on the same day
reversed the lower court judgment and upheld the decision of the health
authority.273 The Court of Appeals found that the medical evidence sup-
ported the Health Authority's judgment that the treatment had a low
chance of success and was not advisable. The Court of Appeals main-
tained the tradition of limited judicial review of NHS decisions.
In P v. North West Thames Regional Health Authority ex parte Rhys
William Daniels,274 the court went slightly further, holding that the action
of a health authority had in fact violated the law. However, :it then granted
no relief. The case involved a three year old boy who needed a bone mar-
row transplant for the treatment of Batten's disease. The unit which was to
do the transplant was closed before it could be done, and the family sued.
The closure was technically illegal because the Health Authority had failed
to consult the Community Health Council first, but the court further held
that the closure was not irrational and that the patient's family did not have
a right to be consulted before the closure. The court refused to order that
the closure be reversed, or even to declare it illegal, because it held it had
no power to do so.
Finally, in one recent case, R. v. North Derbyshire Health Authority,
ex parte Fisher,275 the court actually ordered a health authority to formu-
late and implement a policy making a particular treatment, Beta Interferon
for Multiple Sclerosis, available. The court's decision, however, merely
required the health authority to implement a circular issued by the national
NHS stating that it was national policy to make the drug available, and did
not challenge the health authority's discretion in making rationing deci-
sions generally. It might indicate a greater willingness of the courts to
challenge NIS rationing decisions, but it more likely means simply that in
272. 25 BMLR 5 (1995). Judge Laws relied in part on the European Convention on
Human Rights, which requires public bodies to provide a substantial justification for de-
cisions infringing human rights. The European Convention on Human Rights may in
time prove a grounds for challenging health care rationing decisions in the United King-
dom, although this route is as of yet largely undeveloped. See Rhonda James and Diane
Longley, Judicial Review and Tragic Choices: Ex Parte B, 1995 PuB. L. 367.
273. 2 All. E.R. 129 (1995).
274. Reported in Down by Law, HEALTH SERVICES J., August 26, 1993, at 33.
275. Health Authority Operated Unlawful Policy, THE TIMEs (LoNDoN), Sept. 2,
1997, at 35. The hearing date was July 11, 1997.
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making rationing decisions health authorities may not violate central re-
source allocation policy promulgated by the NHS through regulatory chan-
nels.
On the whole, however, the British courts, in contrast to the German
courts, have refused to recognize the comprehensiveness principle as judi-
cially enforceable with remarkable consistency. They do not interfere with
rationing decisions. The courts also play no role in resource allocation
disputes between payors and providers. Under the 1990 Conservative re-
forms, the Health Authorities, which previously had provided services
through their own hospitals and other provider units, were reconstituted as
purchasers. Hospitals, on the other hand, were spun off into independent
NHS trusts.276 The health authorities are now supposed to contract with
the trusts (as well as with private institutions and institutions directly man-
aged by health authorities) to purchase services.
Disputes often arise regarding the formation or interpretation of these
contracts. The NHS statute states, however, that an NIS contract" ...
shall not be regarded for any purpose as giving rise to contractual rights or
liabilities, but if any dispute arises with respect to such an arrangement,
either party may refer the matter to the Secretary of State for determina-
tion."
2 I
That is, NHS contracts are not enforceable in court, although they are
subject-to arbitration under the auspices of the Secretary of State. As dis-
putes between health authorities and trusts are most severe during the con-
tract negotiation phase (that is, they are more likely to involve the terms of
the contracts being negotiated rather than enforcement of breached con-
tracts) judicial enforcement of contracts would be of limited value in any
event. In fact, not only are the terms of NHS contracts not litigated, they
have only rarely resulted in formal arbitration. The Secretary of State has
issued regulations establishing an arbitration procedure, but the procedure
has almost never been used.278 Rather, theparties usually rely on media-
tion, conciliation, or informal arbitration2 79 A major impediment to the
use of arbitration seems to be the form of arbitration used-pendulum ar-
bitration.80 Under pendulum arbitration, the arbitrator must adopt either
the solution offered by one side or that offered by the other. This approach
276. LONGLEY, HEALTH CARE CONSTrTIONS, supra note 37, at 117-19.
277. NHSA, supra note 265, at § 4(3).
278. David Hughes, et al., Settling Contract Disputes in the National Health Service:
Formal and Informal Pathways, in CONTRACTING FOR HEALTH 98, 106 (R. Flynn and Ga-
reth Williams eds., 1997).
279. L at 104-10.
280. Id at 111.
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does not afford enough flexibility to reach the essentially mamagement so-
lutions necessary for resource allocation. Recent proposals for restructur-
ing the NHS seem to contemplate even less formal arrangements between
purchasers and providers, making judicial involvement even less likely.
281
Although British courts are generally not open to complaints of pa-
tients who believe they have been improperly denied care, there are host of
other avenues.282 Procedures are available for complaints against general
practitioners and there are separate procedures for complaints against hos-
pitals.8 3 The Health Service Commissioner is available as a general om-
budsman when more specific complaint procedures do not apply.28 Other
specialized authorities are available for investigating other specific prob-
lems, such as mental health care.285 The number of complaints to all
sources has risen sharply in the recent past.
286
The existence of complaint procedures underscores the: fact that the
NETS is a public service, answerable to the public. In some cases com-
plaints have, in fact, made a difference. One complaint ito the Health
Services Ombudsman, for example, regarding a stroke patient who was re-
fused long term care within the NHS and had to go to a private nursing
home, resulted in the Ombudsman condemning the NETS policy, the health
authority agreeing to pay for the cost of the patient's care, and a change in
NHS policy accepting responsibility for caring for patients requiring spe-
cialist nursing care.28 Complaint procedures, like conciliation and media-
tion procedures for resolving disputes with providers, allow health
authorities to respond to resource demands without constraining them to
respond to particular demands in precise particular ways.
The NHS also, in the end, remains accountable through malpractice
litigation when resource shortages result in patient injury.288 In Bull v. De-
von Health Authority, for example, a hospital was found liable when lack
of staffing in maternity care resulted in child suffering serious damage
when its mother had to wait for over an hour for a doctor to arrive during a
complicated delivery of twins.
289
281. See Tm NEW NHS, supra note 251.
282. See LONGLEY, PUBLIC LAW, supra note 264, at 66-79.
283. JuDITH ALLsoP & LINDA MULCAHY, REGULATING MEDICAL WORK 180-86 (1996).
284. Id. at 55-72.
285. Id. at 44-47.
286. See HEALTH SERVICE COMMISSIONER FOR ENGLAND, FOR SCOTLAND, AND FOR
WALES, ANNUAL REPORT, 1996-97 (1997).
287. Newdick, Resource Allocation, supra note 264, at 305-06.
288. Newdick, Treat, supra note 261, at 77-118.
289. Eng. C.A. Feb. 2, 1989, available in LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File.
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On the whole, however, the courts respect the discretion granted the
NHS by Parliament to make its own rationing decisions free from judicial
oversight. The courts defer to NIS decisions, retaining only the right,
largely theoretical, to intervene if resource allocation decisions are inde-
fensibly irrational.
VII. American Public Health Care Entitlements: Medicare and
Medicaid
In contrast to the freedom the British National Health Service enjoys
from judicial oversight, America's national health programs are more sub-
ject to judicial supervision. Although the United States is not commonly
regarded as having "socialized medicine," it in fact operates two of the
largest public health care financing systems in the world. Medicare is
America's health care social insurance program. In 1995 Medicare insured
about 38 million Americans, 33.4 million of who are over 65 and 4.6 mil-
lion of whom are disabled, and spent about $187 billion.29 Medicaid
funds health care services for the poor: in 1995 it covered 36.3 million re-
cipients and spent $133 billion.29' Medicare and Medicaid program deci-
sions limiting coverage are both subject to judicial review. The courts
have taken a very different approach, however, to reviewing decisions un-
der the two programs.
A. Medicare
Medicare is a social insurance program, resembling in many respects
the social insurance programs of central Europe. It is, on the whole, more
parsimonious than its European cousins. It is not based on a
comprehensiveness principle: Part A (financed by payroll taxes) basically
covers hospital care and related institutional services (home health, hos-
pice services, very limited nursing facility care), and Part B (financed by
general revenue funds and premiums) covers physician care, treatment by
clinical psychologists or social workers, outpatient hospital care, dialysis,
durable medical equipment and prosthetic devices, home health, and a few
other services; but neither program covers dental care, vision care, or most
prescription drugs.m2 A new Medicare Part C, established in 1997, recog-
nizes a variety of "Medicare+Choice" managed care plans that might ex-
pand services for some Medicare beneficiaries, but are unlikely to dramati-
290. PPRC, supra note 40, at 126, 135.
291. Levit, et al., supra note 12, at 196.
292. See 1 HEALTH LAW, supra note 6, at §§ 13-5, 13-6.
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cally expand coverage except insofar as they charge supplemental premi-
ums.293 Moreover, Medicare imposes much larger copayments than are
common in Europe, as well as deductibles and length of hospital or nursing
home stay time limits that are unknown in Europe.2 94 Medicare is also,
however, in a limited sense more generous: unlike the British National
Health Service and certain sectors of the German health insurance system,
it does not have a fixed budget-Medicare must pay for whatever covered
services its beneficiaries consume. Medicare has thus proved very expen-
sive.
The courts play a very limited role in the Medicare program.295 The
Medicare statute combines a strict exhaustion requirement (from which the
Supreme Court has repeatedly and almost without exception refused to de-
viate) with an exhaustive array and exhausting sequence of administrative
remedies, effectively keeping most disputes from ever reaching the
courts.296 A number of important issues, moreover, are simply removed
from the jurisdiction of the courts by judicial review preclusion provisions.
Private insurers and data processors, called carriers in Part B and in-
termediaries in Part A, pay Medicare claims; they contract with the Health
Care Financing Program to carry out this function. 297 A beneficiary or
physician who has treated the patient on an assignment basis (i.e. has
agreed to present the claim directly to Medicare) who is dissatisfied with a
carrier decision must first request reconsideration from the carrier and
then, if $100 or more is at issue, appeal to the carrier hearing officer.99 If
the carrier's decision remains unsatisfactory, and if $500 or more is in-
volved, the appeal can be taken to a Health and Human Services Adminis-
trative Law Judge, and ultimately to the I-IHS Appeals Council.299 An in-
293. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Title IV, Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, 270,
§§ 4000-4041 (1997).
294. Medicare beneficiaries spent $29.7 billion on Medicare copayments and deducti-
bles for covered services in 1996, 12.9% of the'total expenditures for covered Services.
PPRC, supra note 40, at 136.
295. During 1996, the CCH Medicare and Medicaid Guide reported 109 Medicare-
related cases, many of which involved fraud and abuse issues and most of which were
trial court decisions. During the same year, the BSG entered judgments in 464 appeals
(Revisionen). TATIGKErr, supra note 90, at 24. As nearly 30% of the appeals considered
by the court involved health insurance member or provider issues, id. at 32, the BSG al-
most certainly decided more cases than all reported Medicare decisions. Of course, the
lower social courts decided thousands more.
296. 1 HEALTH LAW, supra note 6, at § 13-32.
297. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395h, 1395u.
298. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.807, .820.
299. 42 C.F.R. § 405.8.
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dividual dissatisfied with a Part A decision can request reconsideration
from the Health Care Financing Administration, followed by, if $100 or
more is at stake, a hearing from an Aministrative Law Judge and Appeals
Council Review 00 In most instances, an appeal can reach a federal court
only after these administrative remedies have been exhausted and when
$1000 or more is at stake °1 Few do so.
Coverage disputes arise in a number of contexts under the Medicare
program, three of which will be addressed here: coverage of new technol-
ogy, medical necessity determinations, and determinations regarding long
term care.3 02 Every year, many new technologies-drugs, devices, and
procedures-become available. The Medicare statute excludes from cov-
erage services "not reasonably necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of
illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body
part,"303 and has been interpreted to exclude experimental procedures.
Decisions as to whether to cover new technologies are in most in-
stances made by carriers and intermediaries applying their own policies
and criteria.304 Decisions regarding a small number of major new tech-
nologies are made at the national level. A panel of HCFA physicians and
health professionals reviews the technology and determines whether to (1)
allow individual Medicare carriers or intermediaries discretion to cover or
not to cover a service, (2) commission a special study (as was done with
heart transplants), or (3) ask the Public Health Service to assess the tech-
nology.3 0 5 If a technology is referred to the Public Health Service for as-
sessment, the assessment is done by the PHS Office of Health Technology
Assessment, which will publish a notice in the Federal Register asking for
300. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.710, .720, .722, .724.
301. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(h), 1395ff(b)(2), 1395ii; see Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602,
606-07 (1984). Where only a constitutional challenge to a statute is involved, the ap-
pellant can proceed directly to federal court without exhausting remedies once the issue
at stake as been presented to the government. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.717 - 405.718e.
302. See 1 HEALTH LAW, supra note 6, at § 13-7.
303. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1).
304. See Eleanor D. Kinney, National Coverage Policy Under the Medicare Program:
Problems and Proposals for Change, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 869 (1988); PHYSiCtAN
PAYMENT REvIEW COMMISSION, REPORT TO CONGRESS, 1994, 113-34; GEERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE TECHNOLOGY AssEssMENT AND MEDICAL COVERAGE
DEcIsIoNs (1994) [hereinafter "GAO MEDICARE"].
305. Louis Hays, From the Health Care Financing Administration: Medicare Cover-
age, 262 JAMA 2794 (1989). See Proposed Rule, Criteria and Procedures for Making
Medical Services Coverage Decisions That Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed.
Reg. 4302 (Jan. 30, 1989).
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comments, do a literature search, and reach a conclusion.306 Although ap-
proval by the Food and Drug Administration of a drug or device does not
guaranty that Medicare will pay for its use, HCFA published a rule in 1995
committing Medicare to cover devices not yet FDA approved but described
as "non-experimental/investigational," i.e., devices that are modifications
or improvements on existing approved devices and that are known to be
safe and effective, if they otherwise meet Medicare payment requirements,
such as reasonableness and necessity.
30 7
Administrative and judicial review of national coverage determina-
tions has been strictly limited since the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1985. Administrative Law judges may not review the validity of
national coverage determinations on administrative appeals. 308 Courts may
not hold national coverage determinations to be invalid for failure to com-
ply with the publication and comment requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act.30 9 If a court determines that the record supporting a na-
tional coverage determination is incomplete or that information supporting
the decision is otherwise lacking, the court must remand the case to HHS
for further consideration, and can only determine that the iter or service is
covered on review of the supplemental record.310 The cases reviewing na-
tional coverage decisions pursuant to these provisions have generally up-
held the challenged coverage determination with minimal scrutiny. 31r For
example, Bosko v. Shalala, a case challenging the refusal of lIfTS to recon-
sider its seven year old policy refusing coverage for autologous bone mar-
row transplantation, held that the HI-IS decision was supported by substan-
tial evidence, claiming that "[t]he Medicare statute 'unambiguously vests
final authority in the Secretary, and no one else, to determine whether a
service is reasonable and necessary, and thus whether reimbursement
should be made."' 3 12 In a few cases, HCFA coverage policies not consid-
ered to be national coverage determinations have been set aside for failure
306. GAO MEDICARE, supra note 304. The staffing of the OHTA permits it to only do
fewer than 10 studies a year.
307. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.203, .205, .207, .209, .211.
308. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(3)(A).
309. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(3)(B).
310. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(3)(C).
311. See Friedrich v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 894 F.2d 829, 838 (6th
Cir. 1990), Mathews v. Shalala, No. 93 Civ. 1408 DC, 1997 WL 124106, *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 18, 1997); Bosko v. Shalala, No. 95-1608, 1996 WL 895356, *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug.
28, 1996).
312. See [1997-1 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) para. 45,139
at 53,524 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 1996) (quoting New York v. Secretary of Health and Hu-
man Serv., 903 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1990)).
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to comply with the notice and publication requirements of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act,313 or a court has remanded a case to supplement the
rule-making record.3 14 Consistent with congressional intent, however, the
courts have stayed on the sidelines with respect to Medicare determina-
tions with respect to technology coverage.
A second category of coverage cases involves utilization review: re-
view of the claims of professionals and institutions regarding the treatment
of individual patients, often involving routine and non-experimental mo-
dalities. Carriers review claims made under Part B are reviewed, and
Medicare Peer Review Organizations review claims regarding inpatient
hospital care.315 Claims are reviewed on both a pre- and post-payment ba-
sis, with denial resulting in non-payment for the service. Reviews are
based on computer algorithms, and vaguely resemble the German effi-
ciency review system. The appeal procedures and judicial review proce-
dures outlined above are available for adverse utilization review determi-
nations, and a handful of cases have ended with judicial review
overturning the original denial.
3 16
Two factors combine, however, to keep medical necessity issues out
of both the appeal and judicial review process. The first is the "waiver of
liability" provisions of the Medicare statute.3 17 If a Medicare beneficiary
receives services ultimately determined not to have been "reasonable and
necessary," Medicare will still pay for the services if neither the benefici-
ary nor the person who provided the service "knew, or could reasonably
have been expected to know," that the services were excluded from cover-
age.31 Beneficiaries are presumed not to have knowledge of noncoverage
absent written notice,319 but providers are expected to know that services
are excluded from coverage on the basis of "HCFA notices, including
manual issuances, bulletins, or other written guides or directives from in-
313. See Linoz v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1986); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr.
v. Shalala, 939 F. Supp. 1457, 1465 (C.D.Cal. 1996).
314. See American Lithotripsy Soc'y v. Sullivan, 785 F. Supp. 1034, 1037 (D.D.C.
1992).
315. See Timothy P. Blanchard, "Medical Necessity" Denials as a Medicare Part B
Cost-Containment Strategy: Two Wrongs Don't Make it Right or Rational, 34 ST. LoUIs
U. L.J. 939 (1990); Alice G. Gosfield, Slouching Toward the Millennium: False Claims
in Medicare Physician Billing, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK, 1997, 51, 76-82) (Alice G.
Gosfield ed.) [hereinafter "1997 Handbook"].
316. See Alice G. Gosfield, Part B Physician Reimbursement Development, Limits,
andPio/alls, in 1990 H-EALTH LAW HANDBOOK 275, 308-09 (Alice G. Gosfield ed.).
317. 42 U.S.C. § 1395pp; 42 C.F.R. § 411.400.
318. 42 C.F.R. § 411.400(a)(2).
319. 42 C.F.R. § 411.404.
19981
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
termediaries, carriers or PROs," Federal Register notices of national cov-
erage decisions, or "acceptable standards of practice in the local commu-
nity. 320 If the provider is deemed to have knowledge of noncoverage, but
the patient is not, the provider may neither bill Medicare nor -the patient for
the cost of the service, and must refund any money collected from the pa-
tient.321 A physician who believes that a service is not covered by Medi-
care may inform the patient of that fact, and provide the service at the pa-
tient's cost if the patient agrees to pay for it independently, 322 but there are,
of course, risks in telling a patient that he or she must pay for a service be-
cause Medicare considers it unreasonable or unnecessary. 323 In the end,
the most likely effect of the "waiver of liability" provisions is to create an
incentive for physicians to err on the side of not providing, or even offer-
ing, services when necessity might become an issue.
This incentive is strengthened by a second phenomena, the recent
dramatic increase in Medicare fraud prosecutions. Federal law provides a
plethora of criminal, civil, and administrative penalties for false claims. A
doctor who submits a false claim commits a felony,324 is subject to both
civil and administrative fines of three times the amount claimed plus $5000
to 10,000 per claim, 325 and, if convicted of a felony, can be excluded from
the Medicare program and from other federal and state health care pro-
grams for five years or more.326 Claims submitted for unnecessary services
are false claims. The false claims acts are increasingly being used to po-
lice billing practices. 327 A recent Office of Inspector General investigation
involving over 100 teaching hospitals challenged as fraudulent the hospi-
tal's billing for the use of investigational devices for treating Medicare pa-
tients.328 There are undoubtedly many professionals and providers who
continue to bill for services of questionable necessity; the payment system
still rewards this. But the risks of doing so are increasing, as are the in-
centives to deny services. Patients denied care, however, because the
doctor simply fails to mention the possibility of a service (because the
doctor fears denial of payment and of liability waiver on the one hand or
320. 42 C.F.R. § 411.406(e).
321. 42 C.F.R. § 411.402.
322. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(1)(C)(ii).
323. See Blanchard, supra note 315, at 1015-21.
324. 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 1347; 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a).
325. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a.
326. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7(a)(1).
327. See Gosfield, supra note 315, at 51.
328. Sanford V: Teplitzky and S. Craig Holden, 1996 Developments in Health Care
Fraud andAbuse, in 1997 HANDBOOK, supra note 310, at 35-36.
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false claims prosecution on the other) cannot appeal the denial, much less
seek judicial review. Thus, judicial review is likely to play a smaller role
in these cases, except insofar as fraud cases become trials on medical ne-
cessity.
329
The courts have been most active in the final category of disputes
considered here: cases involving long term care. Medicare does not pay
for "custodial care,'33° and a host of cases have addressed the question of
whether a beneficiary in a hospital or nursing home was simply receiving
"custodial care., 331 These cases generally involve retroactive denials of
large sums of money, and often both the provider and beneficiary have a
strong incentive to appeal. The cases are fact intensive and depend on the
patient's "total condition."332 Courts tend to go along with the finding of
the patient'sphysician that the patient needed skilled, and not simply cus-
todial, care,3  but other courts recognize that the treating physician often
stands to gain from a decision for the patient and that his or her testimony
must therefore be discounted.3 34 A related issue is the meaning of a need
for "part-time and intermittent care," a statutory requirement for home
health services. 335 Duggan v. Bowen,3 36 in which the court found HHS's
restrictive definition of the term to be arbitrary and capricious and contrary
to law, as well as promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act, is one of the most successful attempts to use the courts to extend
Medicare coverage policy.
337
Duggan and the custodial care cases, however, are the exception
rather than the rule. By and large, restrictions on judicial review, layer
upon layer of administrative remedies, incentives built into the system to
329. Recent fraud and abuse amendments provides civil penalties for false claims
where there is a pattern of billing for services that "a person knows or should know are
not medically necessary." 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(1)(E).
330. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(9); 42 C.F.R. § 411.15(g).
331. 1 HEALTH LAw, supra note 6, at § 13-7.
332. See Ridgely v. United States, 475 F.2d 1222, 1224 (4th Cir. 1973); Whitman v.
Weinberger, 382 F. Supp. 256, 263 (E.D.Va. 1974).
333. See Ridgely, 475 F.2d at 1224; Breeden v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 734, 737
(M.D.La. 1974).
334. See Goodrich v. Richardson [1974 Transfer Binder] Medicare and Medicaid
Guide (CCH) para. 26,885 (E.D.Pa. 1974).
335. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m)(4).
336. 691 F. Supp. 1487, 1514 (D.D.C. 1988).
337. See Eleanor D. Kinney, The Role of Judicial Review Regarding Medicare and
Medicaid Program Policy: Past Experience and Future Expectations, 35 ST. LOtIs U.
L.J. 759, 783-84 (1991). OBRA 1997 enacts into law an expanded definition of cover-
age sought by the plaintiffs in Duggan. See Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 336, § 4012.
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encourage providers to police coverage themselves, and the sheer mind-
numbing complexity of the Medicare statute have operated in tandem to
keep the courts from playing a significant role in Medicare coverage is-
sues.338 They have mainly operated at the margins, occasionally straight-
ening out procedural deficiencies in Medicare decision-making, but have
left to Congress and the administrative agencies the job of running the pro-
gram.
B. Medicaid
Compared to the limited judicial involvement in Medicare coverage
decision-making, judicial involvement in the Medicaid program has been
quite generous, both in terms of its extent and its results. Medicaid is the
federal/state program that finances health care for some of America's poor.
Historically, Medicaid eligibility was tied to eligibility for cash welfare
programs-the program covered the elderly, disabled, blind, and families
with dependent children. Over time, however, Medicaid has been trans-
formed into a program that increasingly pays for care for both elderly and
disabled persons with serious and chronic medical conditions who require
high cost care and poor children and pregnant women, who require rela-
tively low cost, but cost-effective care.339 The majority of program fund-
ing comes from the federal government, and federal statutes and adminis-
trative rules and issuances govern the state programs. 340 The states
participate in the program voluntarily, contributing from about twenty to
fifty percent of program cost, but none have been able or willing to forgo
the federal money the program brings. The federal statute requires cover-
age of certain eligibility groups and the provision of particular benefits, but
the states have considerable discretion in deciding whether or not to cover
optional groups or to provide optional benefits.341 In fact, Medicaid pro-
grams vary significantly in size and scope from state to state.3' 2
338. They have played a somewhat more active role in payment issues, where the con-
siderable resources of providers and their associations are more often brought to bear.
339. See BARRY FURROW, ET AL., HEALTH LAW 865-67 (3d ed. 1997); Sandra J. Ta-
nenbaum, Medicaid Eligibility Policy in the 1980s: Medical Utilitarianism and the "De-
serving" Poor, 20 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 933 (1995).
340. FURROW, ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 339, at 881.
341. Id. at 870.
342. A 1995 GAO report on Medicaid reported that Nevada served 284 Medicaid
beneficiaries for every 1,000 poor or near-poor individuals in the state, whereas Rhode
Island served 913 per 1,000. Similarly, Mississippi spent, on average, less than $2400
per person on Medicaid services, while New York spent an average of almost $7,300 per
person. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID, SPENDING PRESsURs DRIVE STATES
TowARD PROGRAM REINVENTION (1995).
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The Medicaid statute requires states to cover a fairly short list of
services: inpatient and outpatient hospital services; laboratory and X-ray
services, nursing facility and home health services for adults, physicians'
services, nurse-midwife and legally authorized nurse practitioner services,
and early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services
(EPSDT) for children, and a few others. A wide range of optional serv-
ices can be covered by the states, however, and because Medicaid recipi-
ents often have no other means to purchase health care services, and cover-
age of optional services brings federal dollars, many states cover a number
of optional services.
344
Although states have considerable discretion as to deciding what
services to cover at the macro level, their discretion is much more limited
with respect to provision of services to individual patients at the micro
level. The federal courts, following dicta in an early Supreme Court deci-
sion, have consistently read the Medicaid statute as requiring coverage of
available services deemed "medically necessary."345 This has generally
been interpreted to mean services deemed necessary by the recipient's
treating physician.3 46  Under the federal regulations, each Medicaid-
covered service "must be sufficient in amount, duration, and scope to rea-
sonably achieve its purpose."347 A state "may not arbitrarily deny or re-
duce the amount, duration, or scope of a required service... to an other-
wise eligible recipient solely because of diagnosis, type of illness or
condition."348 The EPSDT provisions explicitly define EPSDT, a manda-
tory service for children under twenty-one, to include "necessary health
care, diagnostic services, treatment, and other measures... to correct or
ameliorate defects and physical and mental illnesses and conditions dis-
covered by the screening services, whether or not such services are covered
343. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A); 1396d.
344. See MEDIcARE AND MEDIcAID GUIDE, supra note 312, para. 15,500 for a state by
state list of coverage.
345. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444-45, (1977) (stating that "serioUs 'tatutory
questions might be presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded necessary medical treat-
ment from its coverage.").
346. See Pinneke v. Preiser, 623 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir. 1980) (stating that the deci-
sion of whether or not certain treatment or a particular type of surgery is "medically nec-
essary" rests with the individual recipient's physician and not with clerical personnel or
government officials"). See also Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 200 (8th Cir. 1989);
Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150, 1157 (5th Cir. 1980); Visser v. Taylor, 756 F. Supp.
501, 507 (D. Kan. 1990).
347. 42 C.F.R § 440.230(b).
348. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c).
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under a state plan., 349  Several courts have further held, however, that
states cannot refuse to provide services to persons over twenty-one and that
they must provide under EPSDT to those under twenty-one. 0 A provision
in the federal statute requiring that "assistance shall be furnished with rea-
sonable promptness to all individuals ' 351 has been interpreted to mean that
provision of necessary benefits cannot be deferred or delayed by the
states. 52 Finally, some courts have simply held state Medicaid limitations
to be "unreasonable."
353
The most important factors influencing judicial involvement in Medi-
caid coverage disputes, however, may be jurisdictional rather than sub-
stantive. Unlike the Medicare program, where layer upon layer of admin-
istrative remedies must be exhausted before the beneficiary can get to court
(if judicial review is available at all), the Medicaid recipient can go di-
rectly into federal court. The courts have long recognized the right of
Medicaid recipients to sue state programs that have alleliedly deviated
from federal program requirements under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 4 In Wilder v.
Virginia Hospital Association,355 the Supreme Court recognized the right
of providers to sue directly as well. Some members of the Supreme Court
seem eager to cut back on federal court jurisdiction over benefit program
disputes,356 and the latest Supreme Court precedents could be interpreted
as undermining direct access to the courts.357 However, a recent federal
statute, although it is very poorly drafted, seems to support congressional
intent to keep the federal courts open to recipients, 358 and attempts in the
349. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5).
350. See Fred C. v. Texas Health & Human Serv. Comm'n, 924 F. Supp. 788, 792
(W.D. Tex. 1996) (durable medical equipment); Hunter v. Chiles, 944 F. Supp. 914, 919
(S.D. Fla. 1996); McDaniel v. Betit [1996-2 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCI) para. 44,473 (D.Utah 1996) (organ transplantation); Salgado v. Kirschner,
878 P.2d 659, 660 (Ariz. 1994) (organ transplantation).
351. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(8).
352. See Smith v. Miller, 665 F.2d 172, 174 (7th Cir. 1981); McMillan v. McCrimon,
807 F. Supp. 475, 480-81 (C.D. III. 1992).
353. See Skubel v. Fuoroli, 113 F.3d 330, 336-37 (2d Cir. 1997).
354. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1980); Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Courts,
Health Care Reform, and the Reconstruction of American Social Legislation, 18 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y AND L. 439, 444-49 (1993).
355. See 496 U.S. 498, 524 (1990).
356. See Rosenblatt, supra note 354, at 456-68.
357. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 362 (1992).
358. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2; see Cherry v. Thompson, [1995-2 Transfer Binder], Medi-
care and Medicaid Guide (CCH) para. 43,485 (S.D. Ohio. 1995) (interpreting statute in
Medicaid claim context); see also Brian D. Ledahl, Congress Overruling the Courts:
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1995 federal budget bill to eliminate federal jurisdiction in Medicaid dis-
putes failed to become law.359
The federal courts normally do not require exhaustion of state Medi-
caid program administrative remedies as a condition precedent to litiga-
tion. 0 Many benefit disputes, moreover, come before the federal courts
on motions for preliminary injunctions, brought by desperate recipients
who have been denied treatment that their treating physicians consider
necessary.3 61 These cases focus the court starkly on the irreparable injury
the plaintiff faces, and often allow the plaintiff to obtain the desired serv-
ice on a simple showing of likelihood of success on the merits.362 Because
the Eleventh Amendment prohibits damage awards against the states if
benefits are improperly denied, the courts have all the more incentive to
order the award of benefits prospectively to avoid the need for retrospec-
tive relief.363
Because Medicaid is a state as well as a federal program, recipients
also have the option of suing in state court to obtain benefits. State court
suits are most likely to be brought where state law or state judges are more
sympathetic to the recipient's claim, and plaintiffs therefore win a signifi-
cant proportion of these cases.364 A number of state courts, for example,
Legislative. Changes to the Scope of Section 1983, 29 COL. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 411
(1996).
359. See Balanced Budget Act of 1995, H.R. 2491, § 2154(e)(1) (1995) (prohibiting
judicial review of state Medicaid plans under federal law except by the Secretary of
I-IHS.) A recent court of appeals decision, however, holds that federal regulations re-
quiring the states to provide particular Medicaid services not required by statute are not
enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Harris v. Patton, 127 F.3d 993, 1012 (11th Cir.
1997).
360. See Tallahassee Mem' Reg'l Hosp. v. Cook, 109 F.2d 693, 702 (1Ith Cir. 1997);
Visser, 756 F. Supp. at 504.
361. See, e.g., Mair v. Barton, [1987 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide
(CCH) para. 36,692, available in 1987 WL 108989 (D Kan. July 27, 1987).
362. See, e.g., DeSario v. Thomas, 963 F. Supp. 120, 132 (D. Conn. 1997).
363. The courts also recognize that Medicaid recipients lack the financial capacity to
pay for services up front and sue for reimbursement later. See Dodson v. Parharn, 427 F.
Supp. 97, 108 (N.D.Ga. 1977).
364. Cf state court cases granting denied benefits: Jackson v. Stockdale, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 525, 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (root canal treatment and crowns); Persico v. Maher,
465 A.2d 308, 322 (Conn. 1983) (orthodontic dental services for minor); McCoy v.
Idaho,, 907 P.2d 110, 115 (Idaho 1995) (gastric bypass surgery for obesity); Biewald v.
Maine, 451 A.2d 98, 102 (Me. 1982) (urine testing materials); Buhs v. State Dept. of
Pub. Welfare, 306 N.W.2d 127, 132 (Minn. 1981) (chiropractic X-rays); Kirk v. Dun-
ning, 370 N.W.2d 113, 115 (Neb. 1985) (periodontal treatment); Monmouth Med. Ctr. v.
State Dept of Pub. Welfare, 403 A.2d 487, 494 (N.J. 1979) (hospital services); A.M.L. v.
Dept. of Health, 863 P.2d 44, 48 (Utah 1993) (breast reduction for patient with lupus);
with cases denying treatment: Holmes v. Kizer, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 746, 755 (Cal. App.
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have held that Medicaid beneficiaries have a state constitutional right to
abortion, even though federal funding for most abortions is baned.36 -
The federal courts have quite consistently supported recipient claims
to Medicaid services. Federal courts have, for example, required state
coverage of sex-change operations,
366 access to off-formulary drugs,367
augmentive communication devices, 368 Clozaril for the treatment of
schizophrenia,3 69 and AZT treatment for AIDS.370  Even when optional
services are at issue, the courts hold that the states that have opted to offer
a service cannot deny it to persons who need it. States that provide eye-
glasses for post-cataract surgery patients, for example, must also provide
them for patients with serious refractive error.371 Courts have also reserved
the right to review state determinations that a procedure is "experimental"
and thus not covered.37
Where there are specific federal limitations on Medicaid coverage, the
courts have tended to interpret these quite conservatively and to order
states to provide coverage where it is not prohibited. Congress has repeat-
edly imposed strict limits on the availability of Medicaid funding for abor-
tions, for example, but the federal courts have consistently required the
states to fund medically necessary abortions to the extent not prohibited by
federal law.373  When Congress recently expanded Medicaid abortion
1992) (marijuana); Viveros v. State Dept. of Health and Welfare, 889 P.2d 1104, 1107
(Idaho 1995) (surgery to reduce and reshape child's ears); Anderson v. Dept. of Soc.
Servs., 300 N.W.2d 921, 926 (Mich. 1981) (root canal).
365. See Right to Choose v. Byme,-450 A.2d 925, 941 (N.J. 1982); Moe v. Secretary
of Admin. and Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 485 (Mass. 1981); Committee to Defend Reprod.
Rights v. Myers, 172 Cal.Rptr. 866, 886 (Cal. 1981).
366. See Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir. 1980).
367. See Dodson, 427 F. Supp. at 111.
368. See Hunter v. Chiles, 944 F. Supp. 914, 922 (S.D.Fla. 1996); Fred C., 924 F.
Supp. at 792.
369. See Visser, 756 F. Supp. at 507.
370. See Weaver, 886 F.2d at 199-200; Mair, [1987 Transfer Binder] Medicare &
Medicaid Guide (CCH) para. 36,692, available in 1987 WL 108989.
371. See Ledet v Fischer, 638 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (M.D. La. 1986); see also White v.
Beal, 555 F.2d 1146, 1152 (3d Cir. 1977); Simpson v. Wilson, 480 F. Supp. 97, 103 (D.
Vt. 1979) (state programs that provide glasses for persons with eye diseases must also
provide them for persons with refractive error).
372. See Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d. 1315, 1320-21 (7th Cir. 1993); Meusberger v.
Palmer, 900 F.2d 1280, 1283-84 (8th Cir. 1990); Weaver, 886 F.2d at 198.
373. See Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 184 (3rd. Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 816 (1996); Hem v. Beye, 57 F.3d 906, 913 (10th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, Weil v. Hem, 116 S.Ct. 569 (1995); Preterm v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 134
(1st Cir. 1979).
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funding to cover abortions in rape and incest cases, for example, the courts
required state expansion as well.37 4
Cases involving coverage of organ transplantation under EPSDT also
illustrate this tendency. As discussed above, the EPSDT program requires
the states to provide necessary medical treatment services to children, in-
cluding presumably organ transplantation where necessary. 42 U.S.C. §
1396b(i)(1), on the other hand, requires the states, as a condition of federal
funding, to promulgate written standards respecting coverage of organ
transplantation that treat similarly situated individuals alike and that pro-
vide that restrictions on facilities and practitioners which may provide or-
gan transplantation are "consistent with the accessibility of high quality
care to individuals eligible for the procedures under the State plan." Sev-
eral federal courts have interpreted these provisions as giving the states
discretion over the extent to which their Medicaid programs will cover or-
gan transplantation.375 Other courts, however, have read these provisions
as subordinate to the general requirement that Medicaid cover necessary
organ transplants, and have ordered transplants not available under state
law.376 Still others have interpreted state standards as covering 77 or po-
tentially covering378 organ transplants in situations where the state had de-
nied coverage.
State Medicaid agencies seeking to limit Medicaid coverage have
been most successful in federal litigation challenging coverage limitations
when they have imposed across-the-board utilization restrictions, for ex-
ample, limiting length of coverage for hospital stays3 79 or restricting cover-
age to three physician visits a month3 80 Although these usage restrictions
could have an equally devastating effect on recipients as denials of specific
374. See Knoll, 61 F.3d at 184; Hem, 57 F.3d at 913.
375. See Dexter v. Kirschner, 984 F.2d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 1992); Ellis v. Patterson,
859 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1988); see generally Lisa Deutsch, Medicaid Payment for Or-
gan Transplants: The Extent of Mandated Coverage, 30 COL J.L.& Soc. PROB. 185
(1997); C. David Flower, State Discretion in Funding Organ Transplants under the
Medicaid program: Interpretive Guidelines in Determining the Scope of Mandated Cov-
erage, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (1995); David L. Weigert, Tragic Choices: State Discre-
tion over Organ Transplant Funding for Medicaid Recipients, 89 Nw. L. REV. 268
(1994).
376. See Pittman v. Florida Dept. Health & Rehab. Ser's, 998 F.2d 887, 892 (11th
Cir. 1993); Pereira v. Kozlowski, 996 F.2d 723, 727 (4th Cir. 1993).
377. See Meusberger, 900 F.2d at 1283.
378. See Miller, 10 F.3d at 1320-21 (remanded to determine if liver-bowel transplant
properly characterized as "experimental").
379. See Charleston Mem'l Hosp. v. Conrad, 693 F.2d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 1982); Vir-
ginia Hosp. Ass'n v. Kenley, 427 F. Supp. 781, 786 (E.D. Va. 1977).
380. See Curtis v. Taylor, 625 F.2d 645, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1980).
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services, courts ultimately recognize the authority of states to place some
limits on program expenditures, and tend to see this as a reasonable ap-
proach.381 The Supreme Court has rejected challenges to such limitations
based on their disproportionate effect on disabled persons. 382  Even in
cases completely rejecting challenges to limitations of services by Medi-
caid agencies, however, courts have required state compliance with due
process notice and hearing requirements to permit challenges to individual
applications of the rule.
383
Although recipients have enjoyed considerable success when they
have brought judicial challenges to Medicaid coverage policy, such chal-
lenges are nevertheless relatively rare. By definition, Medicaid recipients
cannot afford medical care, and they cannot afford legal representation ei-
ther. Although legal services programs have represented some in the past,
funding for legal services for the poor has become ever more restrictive.
Medicaid is moving quickly to managed care, and is encouraged to do so
by recent federal legislation.3 4 Although Medicaid managed care plans
must provide grievance and appeal procedures,385 the structures and incen-
tives of managed care plans will render less frequent the situation most
likely to result in a favorable judicial decision: the patient and her doctor
aligned against a state bureaucracy. Judicial activism in the Medicaid pro-
gram has had a significant impact on the program, however, and is in
marked contrast to the restrained role the courts have played in the Medi-
care program.
VIII. Private Insurance Coverage in the United States: From
Contract to Administrative Law
The volume of litigation involving private insurance coverage in the
United States, though not nearly as great as in Germany, is larger than the
volume of public insurance cases, and rapidly increasing.386 This litigation
is unlike that involved in all other programs discussed so far, because it is,
at least in theory, based on contract rather than on statutes and regulations.
381. But see Montoya v. Johnson, 654 F. Supp. 511, 514 (W.D. Tex. 1987) (rejecting
$40,000 cap on inpatient hospital expense payments as impermissible).
382. See Alexander.v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 308-09 (1985).
383. See Cherry v. Thompkins, [Transfer Binder 1995-2] Medicare and Medicaid
Guide (CCH), para. 43,385 (S.D. Ohio March 31, 1995).
384. Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 278, §§ 4701-4710 (1997).
385. 42 U.S.C. § 1932(b)(5).
386.. See Mark Hall, et al., Judicial Protection of Managed Care Consumers: An Em-
pirical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L.REv. 1055, 1060-61
(1996).
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For the past decade, these cases have generally involved high cost thera-
pies sought by patients with critical illnesses (often women with breast
cancer), which therapies have been refused by insurers and claims admin-
istrators who assert that the therapies are experimental and of unproven
value. The rationing issues raised by the cases (as well as the issues they
present regarding the appropriate role of markets, regulators, and profes-
sionals in health care resource allocation, federalism, dispute resolution,
and gender discrimination) have resulted in a considerable body of aca-
demic commentary.
3 87
Historically, health insurance coverage disputes were litigated only
rarely. They often involved marginal therapies or dubious medical value,
as insurers would normally cover therapy if it was ordered by a reputable
physician. 388  When disputes arose, they were generally decided under
rather straightforward contract law principles.38 9 The insured commonly
won, even in some rather extreme cases, as the courts would apply the
principle of contraproferentum to interpret vague and ambiguous contracts
in the insureds favor, or interpret clauses in light of the insured's "reason-
able expectations." 390 In some jurisdictions, the emerging law of bad faith
breach of insurance contracts gave the insured the benefit of tort as well as
387. See generally MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DEcisIONS: THE LAW,
ETHCs, & EcoNomics oF RATIONING MECHANISMS 68-73 (1997); RAND E. ROSENBLATT,
ET AL., LAW AND THE AmEmCAN HEALTH CAE SYSTEM 139-292 (1997); John H.
Ferguson, et al., Court-Ordered Reimbursement for Unproven Medical Technology: Cir-
cumventing Technology assessment, 269 JAMA 2116 (1993); Margaret Gilhooley, Bro-
ken Back A Patient's Reflections on the Process of Medical Necessity Determination, 40
VIL. L. REv. 153 (1995); Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers' As-
sessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1637 (1992); Comment, Barbara A.
Fisfis, Who Should Rightfully Decide Whether a Medical Treatment Necessarily Incurred
Should be Excluded from Coverage under a Health Insurance Policy Provision Which
Excludes from Coverage "Experimental" Medical Treatments, 31 DuQ. L. REv. 777
(1993); Comment, J. Gregory Lahr, What is the Method to Their "Madness?" Experi-
mental Treatment Exclusions in Health Insurance Policies, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
PoL'Y 613 (1997); Richard S. Saver, Reimbursing New Technologies: Why are the
Courts Judging Experimental Medicine?, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1095 (1992); Comment,
Denise S. Wolf, Who Should Pay for "Experimental" Treatments? Breast Cancer Pa-
tients v. Their Insurers, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 2029 (1995).
388. See 1 HEALTH LAW, supra note 6, at § 11-2; Hall & Anderson, supra note 387, at
1645-46.
389. 1 HEALTHLAW, supra note 6, at § 11-2.
390. Hall & Anderson, supra note 387, at 1648-49; Saver, supra note 387, at 1100-
03; Einer Elhauge, The Limited Regulatory Potential of Medical Technology Assessment,
82 VA_ L. REV. 1525, 1549-52 (1996).
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contract law, and raised the stakes for insurers who denied coverage.39' In
others, state insurance mandates denied insurers the discretion to refuse to
392cover certain services.
In the late 1980s, however, several factors changed the nature of in-
surance contract disputes.393 For one thing, the stakes got higher: disputes
became focused on cutting edge therapies that cost tens, if not hundreds, of
thousands of dollars. 394 As insurance markets became more competitive,
insurers may have become more aggressive in denying coverage for such
procedures. 395 Disputes also increasingly involved preadmission or pre-
procedure utilization review denials, rather than retrospective payment de-
nials, and thus presented much more urgently and immediately the need for396
treatment. Disputes began to focus less on therapies commonly regarded
as quackery or as excessive and unnecessary, and more on -therapies that
came from the mainstream of medical practice, even if they remained ar-
guably experimental in nature. 397 Finally, and most importantly, the dis-
putes largely moved from state court, where they were litigated as contract
and tort law claims, to federal court, where the disputes are litigated under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.398
ERISA is a law adopted in the 1970s to protect the security of pen-
sions.399 Incidentally, however, the law regulates employee benefit as well
as pension plans, including health benefit plans. ERISA preempts any
state law that relates to an employee benefit plan.400 State laws that regu-
late insurance, including insurance benefit mandates, 401 are saved from
391. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So.2d 1050, 1053 (Ala. 1987); Hughes v.
Blue Cross, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 857-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); 1 HEALTH LAW, supra note
6, at§ 11-3.
392. 1 HEALTH LAW, supra note 6, at § 11-4.
393. See ROSENBLATr, ET AL., supra note 387, at 212-13; Hall & Anderson, supra
note 387, at 1644-62.
394. The cost of Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation for breast cancer, the most
frequently litigated issue in recent years, ranges from $80,000 to $150,000, GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH INSURANCE, COVERAGE OF AuToLoGous BONE MARROW
TRANSPLANTATION FOR BREAST CANCER 3 (1996) [hereinafter "GAO COVERAGE"].
395. Hall & Anderson, supra note 387, at 1658-62.
396. Id. at 1644-57.
397. Id. at 1651-57.
398. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 etseq.
399. See Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Health Policy and ENSA: Interest
Groups and Semipreemption, 14 J. HEALTH POL, POL'Y & L., 239 (1989) (setting forth
history of ERISA preemption).
400. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
401. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 7:58 (1985).
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preemption! 0 2 Self-insured employee benefit plans, however, are deemed
not to be insurance for purposes of state regulation, and are thus solely
regulated by federal law4 03 In large part because of this proision, sixty
percent of employees in large firms are now in self-insured plans.J°
ERISA also totally preempts tort claims involving denials of insurance
benefits.405 These claims are regarded as based on state law that "relates
to" benefit plans, and are thus preempted under ERISA. They are not,
however, laws that "regulate insurance," and are thus not saved from pre-
emption under ERISA's savings clause.0 6 ERISA allows defendants to
remove insurance claim benefit cases to federal court, where most courts
have held that they are to be tried without ajury.40 7 As most private health
insurance in the United States is obtained as an employment benefit, insur-
ance claims disputes are increasingly being tried in federal courts under
ERISA.
Although many issues involving ERISA remain hotly contested, the
outline of ERISA law as it affects insurance claims disputes is becoming
clear. ERISA permits a beneficiary covered by ERISA plans to bring a
civil action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to fu-
ture benefits under the terms of the plan."408 It does not permit recovery of
extra-contractual or punitive damages, but does allow prevailing plaintiffs
(or defendants) to recover costs and attorney's fees.40 Beneficiaries must
exhaust plan remedies before pursuing judicial remedies.410
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Firestone Tire and Rubber
Company v. Bruch, benefit determinations made by plan fiduciaries and
402. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
403. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
404. Gregory Acs, et al., Self-Insured Employer Health Plans: Prevalence, Profile,
Provisions, and Premiums, 15 HEALTH AF., Summer 1996, at 266, 269.
405. See Pilot Life v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987). Malpractice claims, alleging
substandard medical care, are not preempted by ERISA, and can be brought against man-
aged care plans that provide medical care directly either on corporate negligence or vi-
carious liability theories free from ERISA preemption. See Dukes v. United States
Healthcare, Inc. 57 F.3d 340, 354 (3rd. Cir. 1995) cert. denied 116 S.Ct. 564 (1995).
However, benefit denials, even by managed care plans, are preempted, see 1d. at 356;
Cannon v. Group Health Serv., 77 F.3d. 1270, 1274-75 (10th Cir. 1996).
406. See Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 57.
407. See Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, 953 F. Supp. 419, 422-23 (D.
Mass. 1997).
408. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(1).
409. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).
410. See Hall v. National Gypsum Co., 105 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1997); Denton v.
First Nat'l Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1300 (5th Cir. 1985).
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administrators are generally subject to de novo review by the courts.
411
The Court adopted this standard because it saw ERISA plans as fiduciaries,
and considered a de novo review standard as appropriate for judicial re-
view of fiduciary decisions.412 Where the terms of benefit plans, however,
give plan administrators and fiduciaries "discretionary authority to deter-
mine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan," however,
the Supreme Court observed that a more deferential form of review was
appropriate-plan decisions should be upheld unless they are "arbitrary
and capricious.'Al 3 Health plans are now customarily written, therefore, to
allow substantial discretion to the health plan in determining benefits.
414
Health plans that retain discretion to make coverage decisions win signifi-
cantly more coverage cases than those that do not.
4 5
Even where the plan retains discretion in making benefit determina-
tions, however, the Supreme Court in Bruch suggested that courts should
review determinations more closely where the plan administrator or fiduci-
ary faces a conflict of interest.41  This proposition poses a conundrum.
From one perspective, plan administrators always face a conflict of inter-
est, as an important part of their job is to preserve plan assets to assure
coverage for other plan beneficiaries, keep premiums low, and, in some in-
stances, to make a profit for the plan.417 Even if an administrator does not
bear risk, it may deny claims because its continued position as a plan man-
ager depends to some extent on its success in keeping the costs faced by
411. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). Questions
of law, including interpretation of contracts, are also subject to de novo review. See Fuja
v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405, 1409 (7th Cir. 1994).
412. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 113.
413. See id. at 113; see, e.g., Maune v. International Bhd, 83 F.2d 959, 962-63 (8th
Cir. 1996) (applying standard).
414. Where the contract does not expressly grant the health plan discretion, the courts
apply the de novo review standard to health plan decisions. See Marro v. K-Ill Commu-
nications, 943 F. Supp. 247, 250-251 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). Courts also require that plan
language clearly and unequivocally give the plan discretion. See Adams v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, 757 F. Supp. 661, 666-67 (D. Md. 1991).
415. Hall, et al., supra note 386, at 1063.
416. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
417. See Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 24 F.3d 118, 123 (10th Cir. 1994);
Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (1 1th Cir. 1990); see, arguing
that insurer's interest conflicts are not a serious problem, Hall & Anderson, supra note
387, at 1668-70. Treating physicians, who normally testify for plaintiffs in coverage dis-
pute cases, also usually face a conflict of interest, as they are unlikely to be paid for a
procedure unless the insurer approves it. See Estate of Goldstein v. Fortis Benefit Co.,
available in 1996 WL 18977, *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 1996); Hall & Anderson, supra note
387, at 1066-68.
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the risk bearing employer under control and because it may not want to set
a precedent for coverage for its risk-bearing business.4 8 Courts have
adopted several different approaches to resolving cases once a conflict is
found.419 Some courts have adopted a continuum approach, under which
they consider the degree of conflict faced by the plan administrator or fi-
duciary and adjust the level of review accordingly,420 while other courts
have adopted a two step approach, first deciding whether a substantial con-
flict exists, then placing the burden on the fiduciary to prove that its deci-
sion was not tainted by self-interest.421 The Second Circuit has recently ap-
plied yet another test, considering whether the conflict of interest in fact
influenced the insurers decision.
42
Ultimately, whatever standard a court applies, it is left with the job of
interpreting a contract and applying its terms to the facts of the case. In
doing so, some courts apply common law principles, such as contra pro-
ferentum,42 3 or trust law principles, resolving ambiguities in favor of the
beneficiary.4 24 Other courts, however, have concluded that state common
law of insurance contract interpretation is preempted by ERISA, including
the principle of contra proferentun, and that the courts should read insur-
ance contracts without favoring either party.
425
Treating private insurance coverage disputes as contract disputes is
problematic, however. Coverage cases are in most instances brought by
patients who have not in fact negotiated the contract directly with the in-
surer. Normally the contract is between the insurer and the beneficiary's
418. See Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416, 424 (7th Cir.
1988); ROSENBLATr, LAW & ROSENBAUM, supra note 387, at 240.
419. See Velez v. Prudential Health Care Plan, 943 F. Supp. 332, 340-41 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
420. See Martin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 115 F.3d 1201, 1206 (4th Cir. 1997);
Doe v. Group Hosp. & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir. 1993); Van Boxel v. Journal
Co. Employees' Pension Trust 836 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1987).
421. See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1566-67; see also Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co. Inc. 45
F.3d 1317, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1995).
422. See Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 106 F.3d 475, 477 (2d Cir.
1997); Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1255-56 (2d Cir.
1996).
423. See Lee v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield 10 F.2d 1547, 1551 (1lth Cir. 1994); Doe v.
Group Hospitalization & Med. Serv, 3 F.3d 80, 89 (4th Cir. 1993); Heasley v. Beldem &
Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1257-58 (3rd Cir. 1993); Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 936 F.2d 89, 107 (2d Cir. 1991).
424. See Blair v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir., 1992).
425. See Brewer v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150, 153-54 (8th Cir. 1990);
Allen v. Adage, Inc., 967 F.2d 695, 701 (1st Cir. 1992); Hammond v. Fidelity & Guar.
Life Ins. Co., 965 F.2d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1992).
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employer, and not infrequently the dispute involves a clause added in a
rider or policy modification of which even the employer may not have
been fully aware.426 When providers sue, they are even more: distant bene-
ficiaries of the initial contract.4 27 In making some decisions, insurers apply
internal policies not in fact included in their contracts.428 Even when an
individual policy is involved, the dispute rarely involves truly negotiated
terms, but rather interpretation of forms provided by the insurer.
The courts seem intuitively to recognize these facts. The cases in-
creasingly resemble more judicial review of the reasonableness of regula-
tory actions imposed on beneficiaries than an attempt to interpret and ap-
ply negotiated contract terms.429 Cases in which insureds prevail often
involve arbitrary insurer conduct, much like that condemned in adminis-
trative review proceedings. The largest number of disputes, for example,
concern autologous bone marrow transplantation (ABMT) for treatment of
breast or other cancers. 430 Although insurers have more often than not ap-
proved ABMT claims,431 insurers have often rejected claims for ABMT for
breast cancer, one of the most common forms of cancer, while allowing it
for treatment of less common cancers, where the success of using the
ABMT might be better established, but also where fewer potential cases
are involved, and thus the costs of the therapy over time are less. Therapy
has been often rejected under open-ended criteria, which allow insurers to
make these distinctions, but which appear suspicious to the courts.
432
Courts are also troubled when insurers provide minimal information to pa-
tients regarding denials, change the basis of a denial after it is challenged,
or otherwise fail to address requests reasonably.4 33 Also, conduct of insur-
ers who deny ABMT to women with breast cancer, while approving its use
426. See, e.g., Martin, 115 F.3d at 1202 (small employer claimed that Blue Cross had
never provided it with a copy of the insurance contract); Bushman v. State Mutual Life
Assurance Co., 915 F. Supp. 945 (N.D.Ill. 1996) (plaintiff claimed to have bought policy
based on representations at marketing meeting that it was "equal to or better than" prior
policy, and did not get copy of policy until three months after it was in efNect.).
427. See 1 HEALTH LAW, supra note 6, at § 11-9.
428. See Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 590 (E.D.Va. 1990).
429. See Murphy v. Wal-Mart Assoc. Group Health Plan, 928 F. Supp. 700, 705 (ED.
Tex. 1996); see, advocating this approach, Hall & Anderson, supra note 387, at 1698-
709.
430. See, listing many of the cases, Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 920
F. Supp. 477, 482 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated & remanded, 106 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.
1997); see also Saver, supra note 387, at 1111-18.
431. See generally Peters & Rogers, supra note 208.
432. See Whitney, 920 F. Supp. at 486; Wolf, supra note 387, at 2063..72.
433. See Velez, 943 F. Supp. at 341-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Wolf, supra note 387, at
2072-74.
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for men with testicular cancer, for example, raises interesting gender dis-
crimination issues. 4  On the other hand, insurers that follow reasonable
procedures and apply reasonable substantive criteria are likely to prevail.
Health plans that use independent panels of experts for making decisions,
or that rely on the decisions of external technology assessment bodies, or
that have generous procedures for grievances and appeals are likely to
win!
35
Insurers seem to be winning more cases in federal court under ERISA
than in the state courts under state contract and insurance law.436 In par-
ticular, they do significantly better in the federal appeals courts, where the
courts focus more on the law, which is on the whole favorable to the insur-
ers, and less on the pathetic facts presented by individual dying patients.
4 37
At the trial court level, however, (and particularly where preliminary in-
junctions are sought) many courts are still concerned with the dire condi-
tions of claimants, and put off by the callousness or ineptness of some in-
surers.438  They are also im, ressed by persuasive expert testimony
supporting the insured's claims. 3Even when they rule for insurers they
often do so decrying the fact that statutory law forces them to do so. But
as private law coverage disputes rely less on contract law, and more on in-
434. Wolf, supra note 387, at 2086-89.
435. See Martin, 225 F.3d at 1207-09 (insurer extensively reviewed literature before
denying claim); Santucci v. Hyatt Corp., 955 F. Supp. 927, 930 (N.D. I11. 1997) (insurer
used independent expert reviewers); Healthcare Am. Plans, Inc. v. Bossemeyer, 953 F.
Supp. 1176, 1178-85 (D. Kan. 1996) (elaborate contract and review procedure); Bush-
man, 915 F. Supp. at 946-47 (contract specifically listed covered procedures, not in-
cluding that sought). See, discussing ideal experimental treatment exclusion language,
David Eddy, Benefit Language: Criteria that will Improve Quality Vhile Reducing Cost,
275 JAMA 650 (1996). (Proposed treatment reviewed by panel of two highly qualified
experts completely independent of insurance company). Courts will also enforce policy
provisions requiring disputes to be submitted to arbitration. See Davenport v. Blue
Cross, 60 Cal.Rptr. 2d 641, 648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
436. See Hall, et al., supra note 386, at 1062; Wolf, supra note 387, at 2062.
437. Hall, et al., supra note 386, at 1064; see, e.g., Parks v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 116 F.3d 485 (9th Cir. 1997) available in 1997 WL 303308, *3; Fuja, 18 F.3d at
1412; Maune v. International Bhd of Elec. Workers, 83 F.3d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 1996).
438. See Marro v. K-III Comm., 943 F. Supp. 247, 251-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Hall and
Anderson, supra note 387, at 1676; see Velez, 943 F. Supp. at 338 (holding that prelimi-
nary injunction ordering payment of benefits was prohibitory rather than mandatory,
since it prohibited the insurer from "interference with vested contract rights.").
439. See, e.g., Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 591-93.
440. See Fuja, 18 F.3d at 1407; Bushman, 915 F. Supp. at 953-54; see also Andrews-
Clarke v. Travelers, available in 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17390 (Oct. 30, 1997) (court in
dismissing state law suit against an insurer for wrongful denial of claim removed into
federal court describes ERISA as "ridiculous" and "disturbing").
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terpretation of statutes, and review of the reasonableness of the decisions
of increasingly sophisticated insurers, claimants seem to be losing with in-
creasing frequency.
IX. Conclusion
All developed nations rely on some form of third party payment-so-
cial insurance systems, national health services, commercial insurance--
for fimancing health care services. Because such services and the resources
needed to purchase them are scarce, inevitably someone is denied services
he or she desperately wants, and perhaps desperately needs. Providers are
often, moreover, refused payment for services they have provided to their
patients or believe that their patients need. Patients and providers denied
services or the funds to purchase services often have plausible legal
claims-statutory, regulatory, or contractual-to the denied services or
funds. Sooner or later these claims end up in court. The victims of ra-
tioning turn to the judiciary as their last hope.
The vast majority of instances of rationing are never challenged in
court, of course. Rationing is often effected by mechanisms that do not
present a clear refusal or denial of a service that is subject to judicial re-
view. These mechanisms include deterrence (potential patients are dis-
couraged from seeking services by geographic inaccessibility or unfriendly
receptionists, providers are discouraged from providing services by utili-
zation reviewers whose phone and fax lines are always busy), deflection
(patients are steered away from the service they need to less expensive
services or to services that some other agency will pay for), delay (includ-
ing queues for services and endless requests for more information), or di-
lution (patients get the rationed service, only less of it).441 Only a very tiny
fraction of express decisions to deny or to terminate services, moreover,
are challenged in court, even in countries like Germany that have an active
system ofjudicial review.
Judicial challenges to service denials, however, have a greatly dispro-
portionate impact on subsequent resource allocation decisions. Although
many decisions to deny ABMT for the treatment of breast and other can-
cers were challenged in court in the United States in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, most insurers in fact approved payment for this service during442 443
that time,442 and many did so to avoid potential litigation. Judicial over-
441. See KLEIN, ETAL., supra note 252, at 11-12.
442. Peters & Rogers, supra note 208. In 1990, the national Blue Cross/Blue Shield
organization agreed to fund clinical trials to be carried out under the auspices of the Na-
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sight of the Wirtschaftlichkeitsprjfung system in Germany has largely de-
termined the forms which that process has taken. Even in Britain, where
the courts have in most instances refused to get directly involved in re-
source allocation decisions, the government has from time to time revised
its policies once they were challenged."
It is obvious, of course, that the courts under consideration here are
not fungible. England has no written constitution, a strong civil service,
and a relatively weak tradition of substantive judicial review or adminis-
trative decisions. 45 German social court tribunals include representatives
of insureds or insurance doctors, are specifically constituted to decide so-
cial benefits questions, and operate in an environment of strong constitu-
tional review. American courts draw on both a heritage of judicial inde-
pendence and a tradition of deference to decisions made by contracting
individuals, legislatures and, even administrative agencies.
Even if the courts we have considered are not fungible, they are com-
parable. They are trying to accomplish the same task-reviewing the cov-
erage decisions of payors. And they going about it the same way-deter-
mining contested facts and applying law (as found in statutes, regulations,
or contracts) to the facts to resolve coverage disputes.
The role of courts in resource allocation decisions in the United States
with respect to private insurance has been widely noted. A number of
commentators have observed that the courts tend to support insureds at the
expense of insurers, and that they tend to say "yes" rather than "no.
'" 6
This study, examining the decisions of courts in a variety of health care
systems in response to a variety of claims, reveals a more complex and
textured picture.
It seems to be true that if courts are asked whether a service claimed
by a patient or provided by a provider is "necessary" or "appropriate," they
tional Cancer Institute to study the effectiveness of ABMT. ROSENBLATr, Er AL., supra
note 387, at 253-54.
443. See GAO, supra note 394, at 9; see also Claudia A. Steiner, et al., Technology
Coverage Decisions by Health Care Plans and Considerations by Medical Directors, 35
MED. CARE 472, 480 (1997) (stating that potential legal challenges is a significant con-
sideration in coverage decisions).
444. Newdick, Resource Allocation, supra note 264, at 303, 306.
445. See PETER SHEARS AND GRAHAM STEPHENSON, JAMES' INTRODUCTION TO ENGUSH
LAW 136 (1996) (stating that to be reversed by a court on grounds of irrationality, an
administrative decision must "be so outrageously unreasonable that no sensible person
who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.").
446. Elhauge, supra note 21, at 1550-56; Hall, supra note 386 at 68-73; Hall & An-
derson, supra note 387, at 1674-81; Saver, supra note 387, at 1100-03.
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tend to answer affirmatively.447 In such decisions, the court has before it
an ill or injured patient in a truly pathetic situation, whose immediate and
pressing claim for services is to be weighed against the abstract and theo-
retical claims of persons not present, or of an impersonal organization that
commands considerable resources.44 Judges are, like other decisionmak-
ers, more sensitive to the needs of identified than statistical persons.
449
Courts are also troubled by the conflicts of interest faced by payors, which
are obligated to pay for care required by the claimant, but also are con-
cerned with their own profits and the needs of other insureds. Courts are
less likely to attend to the conflict faced by the treating physician, who
testifies that care he offers the patient is urgently needed.
If, however, the courts are asked to defer to another decisionmaking
body, they will in most instances willingly do so. The most obvious exam-
ple of this is Britain, where the courts seem almost bewildered when asked
to review NIHS resource allocation decisions, given the high degree of dis-
cretion afforded the NHS in these matters.450 Courts seem much less likely
to intervene in Medicare decisions, where there are layers and layers of
administrative review, than in decisions of the Medicaid program, where
there is no exhaustion requirement. In Germany, courts are much less
likely to reject decisions of the Shiedsstelle, which are granted broad dis-
cretion by law, than the decisions of the insurers themselves. While courts
sometimes protest their impotence in these situations, they nonetheless de-
fer as the law requires.451
Finally, and not surprisingly, courts are also capable of constraining
their desire to help patients in need when a statute, regulation, or contract
requires them to consider factors other than need. The German social
courts, for example, have proved adept at applying complex criteria in de-
ciding claims to Hilfsmittel; the American federal courts have enforced
statutory limits on Medicaid abortion coverage and upheld state regula-
tions limiting utilization of Medicaid services where federal regulations
permit states this discretion.
447. Mark Hall's empirical study also found that insureds win well over half the time
in coverage disputes. Hall, supra note 386, at 1062.
448. Hall & Anderson, supra note 387, at 1676-77.
449. See Max Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments, 1985
Wisc. L. Rsv. 239, 253-56 (1985).
450. Hall's study of judicial review of insurance coverage in the United States, how-
ever, also found that the level of success of patients dropped dramatically when the in-
surer retained discretion in making coverage decisions. Hall, supra note 386, at 1063.
451. See cases cited supra note 440.
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In the end, the most important question is what role courts should play
in making coverage decisions. Institutionally, courts are particularly well
adapted to particular tasks, such as resolving claims of right or involving
the application of laws, regulations, or contracts to proposed conduct (e.g.,
is a particular medical device covered under the health insurance law) or
disputes based on claims of fault involving the interpretation of past con-
duct (e.g., was a doctor's performance in the past "uneconomic").
45 2
Twenty years ago, Professor Lon Fuller in a germinal article noted that
courts are less adept at resolving complex disputes regarding multiple par-
ties and policy considerations, and "interacting points of influence," such
as more global disputes regarding the allocation of resources within a
health care system. s5 Such "polycentric" disputes involve intricate net-
works of many persons, facts, and issues and cannot readily be presented
to or resolved by a court.4 54 They are also focused on economic and politi-
cal interests rather than on rights.455 Resolution of some disputes or issues
affects others; institutions and approaches are needed that can incorporate
a more global perspective on the range and relationship of issues than can
courts.
Such disputes are often resolved prospectively through legislative or
regulatory processes.4 56 Legislatures and regulatory agencies are equipped
to hold hearings involving many parties and issues and to arrive at complex
solutions addressing both factual and policy disputes. Each of the health
care systems discussed in this article has developed administrative mecha-
nisms for managing some resource allocation issues: the Schiedsstelle in
Germany; the District Health Authority priority setting and negotiations
processes in Britain; the Medicare technology assessment process or in-
creasingly sophisticated technology assessment programs of major insurers
in the United States.
Whether we should turn to such processes or to the courts for deci-
sions depends on what we want to accomplish. If our primary goal is pro-
tecting the interests of patients, we should assure early and liberal access to
the courts. The German statutory insurance system, imbued with a tradi-
tion of comprehensive coverage and service to patients, has traditionally
embraced this alternative. If, on the other hand, we are more concerned
452. Henry H. Perrit, Jr., And the Whole Earth was One Language: A Broad View of
Dispute Resolution, 29 VaL. L. REV. 1221, 1228 (1984).
453. See generally Fuller, supra note 19.
454. Id at 394-395. The idea was borrowed by Fuller from the writings of Michael
Polanyi.
455. Perrit, supra note 452, at 1229.
456. Fuller, supra note 19, at 398.
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with limiting health care expenditures, then the role of the courts should be
sharply limited, and managerial processes accentuated, as in Britain.
It is possible, however, both to retain and restrain judicial oversight of
health care rationing decisions. This can be accomplished by creating ex-
pert review bodies that are responsible for reviewing denials of services in
the first instance, requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, but al-
lowing judicial review in the end. It may be difficult to achieve the "right"
level of judicial scrutiny, as courts have a tendency to withdraw from the
field once administrative review becomes available, but our evidence also
suggests that courts will carry out policy that is clearly articulated by leg-
islation or contract.
This study suggests a host of models for intermediate review mecha-
nisms: arbitration panels, complaint mechanisms, administrative law
judges, and grievance panels to name a few. The technology is available.
It is up to us, however, to make use of it, to construct a system that will
allocate scarce resources, and that will do so justly.
